The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge v Persons Unknown

An injunction against persons unknown requires full and detailed evidence of a compelling justification. The claimant must show a strong probability that a tort will be committed, causing real harm, and that the threat is real and imminent.

Relief must be procedurally fair, precisely defined and carefully limited to the conduct, land and period justified by the evidence. In protest cases involving private university land, Convention rights and proportionality considerations cannot simply be disregarded. Urgency may justify an interim order, but it does not excuse delay in notifying affected persons or support a wider order than the evidence warrants.

The University sought a five-year final injunction against persons unknown connected with Cambridge for Palestine or otherwise with the Palestine-Israel conflict. It sought restrictions concerning entry, occupation, interference with access and structures at Senate House, Senate House Yard, the Old Schools and Greenwich House.

The European Legal Support Centre was joined as an intervener and sought an adjournment, relying on inadequate notice and procedural unfairness. The University relied principally on three previous occupations, including two affecting graduation ceremonies. The central issues were whether an injunction was justified, whether the application had been fairly notified, and what scope of order was proportionate and necessary.

1. Outcome. The application for a final five-year injunction was refused. A strictly time-limited interim injunction was granted until 23:00 on 1 March 2025, applying only to Senate House and Senate House Yard.
2. Justification. An applicant for an injunction against persons unknown must provide full and detailed evidence establishing a compelling justification. There must be a strong probability that a tort will be committed, causing real harm, and that the threat is real and imminent. The court also considered the adequacy of damages, alternative remedies, the balance of convenience and justice, and the clarity of the proposed order ([2023] UKSC 47, especially §218).
3. The evidence established a sufficiently real and imminent risk of occupation of Senate House Yard before the forthcoming graduation ceremony. Previous occupations had involved tents, remained until the ceremony was relocated, and were accompanied by communications referring to disruption and a future return. The evidence justified only the narrow interim relief granted.
4. The University’s delay in publicising the proceedings was a significant procedural concern. The requirement to serve an application at least three days before the hearing did not displace the freestanding requirement to serve it as soon as practicable. Nevertheless, the imminent graduation ceremony and the limited scope of the order meant that the application could be fairly determined to that extent.
5. The order was confined to conduct on University land. The court declined to restrain conduct outside University land, and found no sufficient procedural or substantive justification for including the Old Schools or Greenwich House, or for granting relief for five years. The order covered entry, occupation or remaining on the land, and erecting or placing structures, but not a rally opposite the University.
6. Convention rights were treated as potentially engaged, and the court applied a case-specific proportionality approach. Blanket restrictions were inappropriate. The limited order was justified by the particular evidence and the impact of further relocation on graduates, guests and the University.
7. The persons unknown description was to be simplified and the order was to include a requirement for permission before instituting contempt proceedings, given the procedural concerns and the circumstances of the case.