The University of London v Abel Harvie-Clark & Ors

An interim precautionary injunction may be granted against identified persons and persons unknown where the claimant establishes a cause of action, sufficient evidence of threatened unlawful conduct, no realistic defence, and an inadequate remedy in damages.

Injunctions affecting protest must also respect Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Those rights do not generally confer a freedom of forum or a right to trespass on private land. The court must assess whether the order is proportionate, including whether effective protest remains possible elsewhere or in an orderly form.

The order must clearly identify affected persons, define the prohibited conduct and geographical area, correspond with the pleaded claim, contain appropriate temporal and service provisions, and permit applications to vary or discharge it. The balance of convenience remains decisive.

The University of London sought an interim precautionary injunction against three named protesters and three categories of persons unknown. The proposed order concerned threatened trespass, obstruction, interference with access, and the erection of tents or other structures on university land in connection with protests relating to SOAS.

The application followed an earlier possession order concerning an encampment. After the protesters relocated to other land, the claimant relied on evidence of continuing protest activity, trespass and a risk of further occupation. The central issues were whether the claimant had established the requirements for a precautionary injunction against persons unknown, whether the proposed order disproportionately interfered with Articles 10 and 11 rights, and where the balance of convenience lay.

1. Order granted. The court granted an interim precautionary injunction, with minor amendments, together with directions for progressing the claim for a final injunction. Costs were reserved.
2. The claimant had a cause of action in trespass. Its title gave it control over occupation of the land, subject to any permission granted under its Code and Visitor Regulations. The evidence established a serious issue and a realistic prospect of success, including a well-founded fear of further unlawful trespass.
3. There was no realistic property-based defence. The claimant had also satisfied the requirement of full and frank disclosure and had provided sufficient evidence. Damages were inadequate because further occupation could cause reputational and operational harm, security and cleaning costs, and damage that would not readily be compensated. Private security was not a more appropriate alternative remedy.
4. Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights protected peaceful protest but were qualified rights. The order pursued legitimate aims and was proportionate. The Convention did not generally confer a freedom of forum or a right to trespass on private property, as illustrated by Appleby v UK, Boyd v Ineos Upstream Ltd and DPP v Cuciurean. The proposed order did not prevent all protest: orderly protest remained possible under the claimant’s Code and Visitor Regulations, and other means and locations remained available.
5. The persons unknown were clearly and plainly identified by the prohibited tortious conduct and defined geographical boundaries. The prohibitions were expressed in clear language, matched the pleaded claim, and included suitable temporal limits, service provisions, and a right to apply to vary or set aside the order. A long-stop date of one year was appropriate unless extended by the court.
6. Applying the approach in DPP v Ziegler and City of London Corp v Samede, the balance of convenience favoured relief. Without the injunction there was a real risk of further unauthorised occupation, cost, reputational damage and disruption to students. With it, the defendants retained meaningful opportunities to protest and could return to court if the claimant acted unreasonably.