University of Nottingham v Joel Butterworth (also known as River Butterworth) & Anor

A summary possession order is appropriate where the claimant has established its right to possession, the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim, and there is no other compelling reason for a trial. A university’s free-speech duties do not require it to tolerate an unauthorised trespassory encampment or engage outside the procedural framework governing use of its premises. Convention rights may be limited where the interference is prescribed by law, pursues a sufficiently important objective, is rationally connected to that objective, is no more intrusive than necessary, and strikes a fair balance. Peaceful protest remains relevant, but prolonged trespass without advance notice and in breach of the applicable code may place conduct at the margin of Articles 10 and 11 protection.

The University sought summary possession of Jubilee Campus against Mx Joel Butterworth and persons unknown following an unauthorised protest encampment concerning the war in Gaza and the University’s alleged links with arms companies.

Mx Butterworth relied on a public law defence, alleging breaches of the University’s free-speech policy, section 43 of the 1986 Act and section A1 of the Higher Education and Research Act 2017. They also alleged that possession proceedings would breach section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, read with Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. The issue was whether there was a real prospect of successfully defending the possession claim, or any other compelling reason for a trial.

1. Summary possession test. The applicable test was whether there was no real prospect of a successful defence and no other compelling reason why the claim should be disposed of at trial. The University proved its freehold ownership and entitlement to possession, subject to any viable defence.
2. Public law defence. The University’s free-speech policy did not require engagement with the campers. The Code provided a structured framework for events and meetings, but the campers had not invoked it. There was no evidence that the University acted because of their beliefs or views, rather than because they had appropriated the University’s land and were trespassing. The University therefore had no real prospect of being found in breach of its policy or section 43 of the 1986 Act.
3. Section A1 of the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 was not in force, so no breach of it could arise.
4. Convention rights. Applying the reasoning in the Birmingham judgment, the decisions were prescribed by law. The objective pursued was sufficiently important, the measures were rationally connected to it, and no less intrusive measure could achieve the objective without unacceptable compromise. The balance favoured the University. The protest was peaceful on the assumed facts, but it was unauthorised, involved prolonged trespass, and could have been pursued through other lawful means.
5. There was no other compelling reason for a trial. The claim against persons unknown was proved and could be described compositely under CPR 55.3(4). A possession order was made for the whole Jubilee Campus.

First-instance summary possession proceedings. The judgment refers to a contemporaneous related decision of the High Court in University of Birmingham v Persons Unknown, cited as [2024] EWHC 1770 (KB), whose reasoning was applied on common issues.