Dr Mahendra Nathadwarawala v General Medical Council

A statutory appeal is brought only when the appellant complies with the applicable court procedure. An unsigned Appellant’s Notice is not a valid notice and cannot start appeal proceedings. CPR r.3.10 cannot retrospectively validate a document that was incapable of commencing proceedings.

A statutory time limit may be extended under Article 6 only in exceptional circumstances, where refusing an extension would impair the very essence of the right of appeal. The assessment includes proportionality, legitimate aims, and the appellant’s care and diligence. Dishonesty by a medical practitioner does not mandate a particular sanction. The tribunal must assess the seriousness of the specific conduct, culpability, harm, impact on professional reputation and mitigation.

The appellant, a medical doctor, appealed against a Medical Practitioners Tribunal decision suspending his registration for six months, with a review, following findings of misconduct and dishonesty.

The Medical Act 1983 required the appeal to be brought within 28 days. The appellant submitted an unsigned Form N161 and paid the fee within time. He submitted a signed form after the deadline, following notification by court staff that the first form could not be accepted.

The court considered whether the unsigned form commenced an appeal, whether CPR r.3.10 permitted retrospective validation, and whether the court could extend time consistently with Article 6. It also considered, in the alternative, whether the sanction was excessive.

1. Jurisdiction. Section 40(4) of the Medical Act 1983 required the appeal to be brought within 28 days, subject to the procedural rules governing appeals. Practice Direction 52B required an Appellant’s Notice. Form N161 had to be duly completed. Its express signature requirement made signature a significant substantive element, not a mere formality. The unsigned form therefore did not constitute a valid notice or commence an appeal.
2. CPR r.3.10. The rule applies to procedural errors in proceedings that have already commenced. It cannot create valid proceedings from a document that was a nullity. The failure to sign the form also concerned a statutory requirement governing the commencement of the appeal, rather than merely an error during existing proceedings.
3. Extension of time. Following Adesina and Stuewe, the court had a power, or duty, to extend time only in exceptional circumstances where refusing that power would impair the very essence of the right of appeal. The inquiry included whether exclusion would be disproportionate, while recognising the legitimate aims of procedural certainty and compliance. The appellant was physically able to file a valid appeal, had left filing until near the end of the period, and had failed to follow the clear signature requirement. Refusing an extension therefore did not impair the essence of his right of appeal.
4. Alternative merits conclusion. Under CPR r.52.21(3), the court could intervene only if the MPT’s decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity. The appellate jurisdiction was by way of rehearing, but appropriate deference remained due to the tribunal. Dishonesty did not automatically require erasure or another fixed sanction. The MPT had to assess the specific conduct, culpability, financial or other harm, damage or risk to professional reputation and mitigation. The six-month suspension was reasonable, proportionate and appropriate. The later repayment of the debt could not establish that the original decision was wrong.
5. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Even if it had been in time, it would have been dismissed on its merits.

The judgment itself records no earlier appellate decision in the same dispute. The appeal was brought to the Administrative Court against the Medical Practitioners Tribunal’s decision dated 30 May 2023.