Richard Lukins & Anor v Quality Part X Limited & Anor

For limitation purposes, proceedings are not necessarily brought when a claim form reaches the court. A claimant must have done at least all that could reasonably be expected to ensure issue within time, having regard to the applicable rules, practice directions, representation and communications with the court. A legally represented party who posts a claim form contrary to a long-standing mandatory electronic-filing requirement cannot rely on earlier receipt under CPR PD7A 6.1. CPR 3.10 cannot remedy a procedural error made before proceedings exist, nor can a rule of court disapply a primary limitation provision.

The claimants sought damages in negligence and/or nuisance for fire damage to business and personal possessions. Their solicitors posted claim forms to the King’s Bench Division before expiry of the six-year limitation period. The court returned them because legally represented parties were required by CPR PD51O to use electronic filing. Proceedings were subsequently issued electronically, after limitation had expired.

The defendants applied for summary judgment under CPR 24.3(a), contending that the claims were time-barred under section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980. The claimants argued that receipt by the court constituted bringing the claims under CPR PD7A 6.1, or alternatively that CPR 3.10 could remedy the error.

1. The defendants’ applications succeeded. Summary judgment was entered for the defendants because the claims were time-barred and the claimants had no real prospect of success. There was no compelling reason for a trial.

2. The court applied the summary-judgment principles in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch). This was a short point of law and construction, suitable for determination without a trial.

3. For the purpose of deciding when proceedings are brought, the relevant question is whether the claimant did at least all that could reasonably be expected to ensure that proceedings were issued within time. Relevant factors include the requirements of the rules and practice directions, whether the claimant was legally represented, and the content and timing of communications with the court.

4. The claimants’ solicitors were required by CPR PD51O to use electronic working. That requirement had existed for over five years. Posting the claim forms therefore failed to satisfy the applicable standard of reasonable steps, and CPR PD7A 6.1 did not make the claims brought when the posted forms were received.

5. The position of a litigant in person, who was expressly permitted to use postal filing, did not determine the position of a legally represented claimant subject to the mandatory electronic-filing requirement.

6. CPR 3.10 was unavailable because no proceedings existed when the procedural error occurred. In any event, primary legislation could not be abrogated by a rule of court. The reasoning in Karen Lawrence [2024] EWHC 3061 (Admin) could not prevail to the extent that it conflicted with the Court of Appeal authorities.