St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council v Barnes

For limitation purposes, an action is brought when the claimant delivers to the correct court office a claim form, request for issue and court fee during opening hours. It is not postponed until the court issues the form.

Accordingly, CPR rule 7.2, under which proceedings are started on issue, does not give the word “brought” in the Limitation Act 1980 the same meaning. Paragraph 5.1 of the Practice Direction supplementing CPR Part 7 is valid guidance and is compatible with the rule. A claimant who has taken the necessary step within time does not bear the risk of delay by the court in processing the claim.

The respondent alleged personal injury and loss arising from negligent education by the appellant local education authority. The primary three-year limitation period expired on 5 November 2004.

On 4 November, the respondent's solicitor delivered a claim form, request for issue and the court fee to Liverpool County Court. The court date-stamped the accompanying letter that day, but industrial action meant that the claim form was not issued until 8 November.

His Honour Judge MacMillan held that the claim had been brought in time under paragraph 5.1 of the Practice Direction supplementing CPR Part 7. The council appealed. The central issue was whether a claim is brought for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 on delivery to the court or only on issue under CPR rule 7.2.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court upheld the conclusion that the claim was brought within the primary limitation period.

2. CPR rule 7.2 is clear: proceedings are started on the date of issue entered by the court. That procedural event did not, however, determine when an action was brought under section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980.

3. The court construed “brought” by reference to an act within the claimant's control. A claim is brought when the claimant delivers to the court office a claim form, request for issue and fee. Issue is a transactional act performed by the court. The claimant should not lose the statutory period because the court is closed or delays processing documents after their proper delivery.

4. Paragraph 5.1 of the Practice Direction correctly reflects that construction. It does not contradict CPR rule 7.2. Paragraphs 5.2 to 5.4 provide a practical means of recording and establishing the date of delivery, so that any resulting uncertainty is manageable.

5. The issue date remains significant for the separate purpose of calculating the time for service under CPR rules 7.5 and 7.6. The ruling was confined to actual delivery, by a permitted means, to the correct court office during opening hours. Different considerations might arise for delivery to a wrong place or outside those hours.

6. Because delivery occurred on 4 November, the claim was brought before expiry of the limitation period. It was unnecessary to consider disapplication under section 33 or the alternative Human Rights Act argument.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed in [2006] EWCA Civ 1372. The court affirmed that the claim had been brought in time.

• Liverpool County Court: His Honour Judge MacMillan held that paragraph 5.1 of the Practice Direction supplementing CPR Part 7 applied and that the claim was within the primary limitation period.