Amy Eskander v General Medical Council

An external statutory appeal initiated by an appellant’s notice is brought when the originating process is delivered to the court office within the statutory period, even if no fee, or an insufficient fee, is paid, provided the court does not reject the notice and subsequently issues it. Filing and issuing are distinct. The same approach applies to statutory appeals as to limitation periods where the originating process begins proceedings. A court may address non-payment by requiring the fee and treating failure to pay as failure to proceed. Alternatively, under Article 6, where refusal to extend time would impair the essence of the right of appeal and the appellant has reasonably done all possible, the court has a duty to extend time. A litigant receiving direct-access legal advice is not automatically fixed with the adviser’s omissions where the adviser was not acting as the litigant’s representative.

Dr Amy Eskander appealed from an order of Mansfield J striking out her statutory appeal against a Medical Practitioners Tribunal decision suspending her registration. The 28-day period under the Medical Act 1983 expired on 23 September 2025. She e-mailed her appellant’s notice to the Administrative Court Office that day, but paid no fee until 17 October. The notice was sealed on 21 October and recorded a filing date of 23 September.

The appeal concerned whether delivery of the appellant’s notice was sufficient to bring the statutory appeal in time, despite non-payment and the method of filing. The Court also considered fresh evidence and, alternatively, whether Article 6 required an extension of time.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Nugee LJ gave the reasons, with Baker and Cobb LJJ agreeing. Dr Eskander’s statutory appeal was reinstated and allowed to proceed in the High Court. Her suspension ceased to have effect pending determination of that appeal.
2. Meaning of bringing an external statutory appeal. By analogy with Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey [2026] EWCA Civ 215, an external appeal is brought when the appellant delivers the originating process to the court office within the statutory period. The requirement to pay a court fee is important for issue but ancillary to commencement. There is no logical distinction between paying too little and paying nothing. Both situations involve delivery of the necessary document with a failure to comply fully with an administrative requirement.
3. The same analysis applies to the statutory wording in section 40(4) of the Medical Act 1983 as to the limitation wording considered in Siniakovich. It would create unnecessary inconsistency if the answer depended on the precise statute. The Court left open the position concerning internal appeals.
4. Although Practice Direction 5B paragraph 2.2 restricted e-mail filing where a fee was payable, paragraph 2.4 gave the Court a discretion to reject the document. The Administrative Court Office had not exercised that discretion. Its correspondence and subsequent sealing of the appellant’s notice amounted to acceptance. It was therefore too late to rely on the fact that the notice might originally have been rejected.
5. The Court recognised, obiter, a potential gap in the statutory scheme governing when a professional sanction takes effect. It suggested that the court could require payment within a specified period and treat failure to pay as failure to proceed, potentially allowing the appeal to be treated as withdrawn.
6. Fresh evidence. The criteria in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, applied flexibly under CPR rule 52.21(2)(b), were satisfied. The e-mails were apparently credible, important to the time-extension issue, and could not reasonably have been expected to be deployed earlier. The ordinary surrogacy principle did not apply because the barrister had provided direct-access advice but was not conducting the litigation. It was not reasonable to expect Dr Eskander to waive privilege and criticise that advice before the strike-out order revealed the problem.
7. Article 6 alternative. If non-payment had made the appeal out of time, the fixed period would, on these facts, have impaired the essence of the right of appeal. Dr Eskander had personally done all she reasonably could. The Court would therefore have been under a duty to extend time.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal, admitted the fresh evidence, reinstated Dr Eskander’s statutory appeal and allowed it to proceed.
2. High Court, King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Mansfield J ordered on 14 November 2025 that the appellant’s notice be struck out, holding that the appeal had not been brought within time and that time should not be extended.