Van Aken v Camden London Borough Council

Filing a document means delivering it to the court office. Delivery is a unilateral act and requires neither receipt by an officer nor subsequent authentication by the court. A document placed through the court’s designated letter box is therefore filed when it is deposited, even if the office is closed.

A practice direction is subordinate to the Civil Procedure Rules. Administrative provisions concerning the recording of documents cannot alter the clear meaning of the rule defining filing.

The appellant challenged a local housing authority’s review decision by appealing under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996. The statutory period expired on 17 December 2001. Her solicitors transmitted the documents by fax after 4 pm and deposited a complete set through the county court’s letter box at 6.30 pm that day.

The Central London County Court treated the appeal as filed on the following morning, when court staff processed and dated it. His Honour Judge Cowell dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that it was out of time and that the court could not extend the statutory period.

The central question was whether delivery through the court’s letter box after its public opening hours constituted filing on the day of delivery.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Jonathan Parker LJ gave the leading judgment. Mummery and Ward LJJ agreed that the appellant’s notice had been filed within the statutory 21-day period.

2. Under CPR 2.3(1), filing means delivery, by post or otherwise, to the court office. Delivery to an office is a unilateral act. It requires no court officer to receive, process or authenticate the document. The current rule requires delivery to a place, unlike the former rule considered in Aadan v Brent London Borough Council, which required delivery to the proper officer.

3. The letter box was a designated means of communicating with the court office outside its opening hours. The notice was consequently delivered and filed when it was placed through that letter box at 6.30 pm on 17 December 2001. The appeal was therefore brought within section 204(2) of the Housing Act 1996.

4. The approach in Swainston v Hetton Victory Club Ltd was applied. If presenting a document to a tribunal through an available letter box can be a unilateral act, delivery to an office is more clearly complete upon deposit. Aadan was distinguished because its former procedural rule required receipt by an individual.

5. Practice directions are subordinate to the Civil Procedure Rules. The provisions concerning the recording of filing dates were matters of internal court administration and could not alter the clear definition in CPR 2.3(1). Possible evidential uncertainty about the precise time of hand delivery did not justify a different construction.

6. The court did not decide whether the fax transmission also constituted timely delivery. It likewise expressed no view on the former power to extend time, because the appeal had been brought in time and the newly inserted section 204(2A) had made that issue prospective only.

7. The order below was set aside. The section 204 appeal was remitted to the county court for hearing, with costs here and below awarded to the appellant.

1. Court of Appeal: The appeal was allowed unanimously. The order dismissing the statutory appeal was set aside, and the appeal was remitted to the county court for hearing.

2. Central London County Court: His Honour Judge Cowell dismissed the appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 for want of jurisdiction. He held that the appellant’s notice had been filed after the statutory period and that the court had no power to extend time.