Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Ahmed Aweys

A serious crime prevention order may be made where the court is satisfied that the person has been involved in serious crime and has reasonable grounds to believe that the order will protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting further involvement in serious crime.

The court must assess future risk and ensure that each restriction is proportionate, clear, realistic, precise and capable of enforcement. The order is preventive rather than punitive. Its duration and individual conditions require separate justification, particularly where Article 8 rights are engaged. Existing notification requirements do not necessarily make an order unnecessary if they do not sufficiently monitor and manage the assessed risk.

The Commissioner of Police applied to the Administrative Court under sections 1 and 8A of the Serious Crime Act 2007 for a five-year serious crime prevention order against Ahmed Aweys.

The application relied on the defendant’s terrorism-related convictions, assessed continuing extremist mindset, repeated breaches of licence, notification and TPIM restrictions, and limited engagement with rehabilitative intervention. A temporary order had previously been made by Chamberlain J pending the substantive hearing.

The central issues were whether the statutory conditions were met, whether an order was necessary and proportionate alongside existing notification requirements, and whether the proposed restrictions and duration were justified.

1. Application granted. The court was satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant had been involved in serious crime and that there were reasonable grounds to believe that an SCPO would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement in terrorism-related offences.
2. The application was properly brought under sections 1 and 8A of the Serious Crime Act 2007. The defendant’s offences under section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 and section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 were terrorism-related trigger offences. It was unnecessary to decide whether the notification-requirement offences also qualified under section 8A(3)(d).
3. The statutory discretion involved an evaluative judgment. The relevant question was future risk. There had to be a real or significant risk, rather than a bare possibility, of further serious offending. The court considered the defendant’s convictions, persistent extremist ideology, risk assessments, repeated non-compliance with control measures and lack of meaningful rehabilitative engagement.
4. Following R v Hancox, an SCPO is preventive, not punitive. Its provisions must serve the statutory purpose and be proportionate. They must also be clear, realistic, precise and capable of enforcement, because breach may constitute a criminal offence. Existing Part 4 notification requirements were insufficient to manage the assessed risk after the defendant’s licence expired.
5. The court granted an order for three years, rather than the five years sought. A five-year period risked disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights and the necessity of the order should be reviewed after three years.
6. The communication, internet, vehicle, financial, employment and child-contact restrictions were generally proportionate because they addressed identified risks and permitted legitimate activity subject to notification or supervision. However, the proposed prohibition on contact with the defendant’s children, former wife and one younger brother was disproportionate and those persons were removed from the specified list. The SCPO came into force at midnight on 17 December 2024 and ceased at midnight on 17 December 2027.

The judgment was a first-instance determination of the Commissioner’s application. A temporary SCPO had previously been made by Chamberlain J pending the substantive hearing; the present court granted a three-year order with modified conditions.