Parsons, R. v

A Sexual Harm Prevention Order must be necessary to protect the public from sexual harm. Its prohibitions must be effective, clear, realistic, tailored to the facts, non-oppressive and proportionate. A blanket prohibition on internet access will ordinarily be unrealistic, oppressive and disproportionate, and could be justified only in a truly exceptional case.

Internet-related restrictions should instead be targeted. They may require notification of devices, retention of browsing history, inspection and the installation of monitoring software. Restrictions on cloud storage, encryption and wiping software should address deliberate steps that conceal material, without criminalising ordinary functions intrinsic to modern devices. Contact restrictions require an identifiable risk of contact offending and must be tailored to the relevant children at risk.

Two appeals against sentence were heard together because both concerned internet-related prohibitions in Sexual Harm Prevention Orders.

Morgan had pleaded guilty at Worcester Crown Court to offences involving indecent images of children, extreme pornography and a prohibited image of a child. His five-year order effectively prohibited ordinary internet access. Parsons had pleaded guilty before the magistrates to making indecent photographs of children and possessing cannabis, and was sentenced at Lewes Crown Court. His ten-year order imposed contact restrictions and detailed internet, cloud-storage and encryption restrictions.

The central issues were whether the existing terms were necessary and proportionate, and how earlier guidance on internet restrictions should operate under the Sexual Harm Prevention Order regime.

1. The appeals were allowed to the extent indicated. The court quashed both Sexual Harm Prevention Orders and substituted revised orders. It also corrected unlawful or excessive ancillary sentence orders.

2. The court applied the three questions formulated in R v NC, [2016] EWCA Crim 1448. An order must be necessary to protect the public from sexual harm. Its individual terms must not be oppressive, and the order must be proportionate overall.

3. The guidance in R v Smith, [2011] EWCA Crim 1772, remained essentially sound. A blanket ban on internet access or use will usually cut an offender off from ordinary legitimate life. The importance of internet access had increased since Smith. Such a ban could be appropriate only in truly exceptional circumstances.

4. Appropriate controls should be practical and targeted. An offender may be required to notify the police of internet-capable devices, preserve browsing history, provide devices for inspection and permit police-selected monitoring software to be installed. A term must not effectively create a blanket ban by making use contingent on police approval of software.

5. Cloud-storage and encryption terms should not prohibit default and intrinsic functions of modern devices. They may instead target deliberate installation or use of remote storage, encryption or wiping software that can conceal material from supervision. Notification and inspection requirements provided a workable and proportionate solution.

6. Contact restrictions require an identifiable risk of contact offending. In Parsons’s case, searches for online chat websites provided sufficient basis for some restrictions. They were confined to female children, reflecting the offending, but properly extended to those under 18 because that was the statutory definition of a child for a Sexual Harm Prevention Order.

7. Morgan’s effective blanket internet ban was unrealistic, oppressive and disproportionate. Parsons’s disputed monitoring, cloud-storage and encryption terms were too blunt. The substituted orders imposed targeted conditions. Morgan’s victim surcharge was quashed and the sentence on counts 1–3 was quashed with no separate penalty. Parsons’s victim surcharge was reduced from £115 to £100.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The conjoined appeals against sentence were allowed to the extent indicated. The court quashed and substituted the Sexual Harm Prevention Orders.
• Worcester Crown Court: Morgan received a community order and a five-year Sexual Harm Prevention Order. The order and specified ancillary sentence provisions were varied by this court.
• Lewes Crown Court: Parsons received suspended custodial sentences and a ten-year Sexual Harm Prevention Order. The order was quashed and replaced, and the victim surcharge was reduced.