Connor v R

A sexual offences prevention order must be tailored to the offender’s circumstances and risk. A blanket prohibition on computer or internet use is impermissible, disproportionate and liable to be unworkable. Restrictions must be clear, necessary and proportionate, and need not prohibit conduct which is already unlawful.

On an appeal against such an order, the court may substitute provisions of a different kind if a detailed assessment of the overall order shows that it is not more severe. The statutory restriction on varying a SOPO so as to extend its period concerns duration, not the scope of individual provisions.

The appellant received 16 months’ imprisonment for sexual offences, including voyeurism and offences concerning sexual images, together with a ten-year sexual offences prevention order. The order substantially prevented him from using the internet, social media, image-recording devices and communication with persons under 18.

After his release, the supervising police considered the order unworkable. An attempted variation did not resolve the matter. The Court of Appeal treated the application as an appeal against the original order under Sexual Offences Act 2003, section 110(1), extended time and granted leave.

The central issues were whether the original restrictions were lawful and proportionate, and whether a substituted order containing additional child-contact restrictions would be more severe overall.

1. Appeal allowed. The court extended time, granted leave, quashed the original SOPO and substituted a fresh order. Delay in reaching the court was not the appellant’s fault, and an appeal was inevitable because the original order was unworkable and disproportionate.
2. A SOPO must be tailored to the circumstances of the case. Applying R v Smith [2012] 1 WLR 1316, a blanket prohibition on computer or internet use was impermissible. The original first paragraph would probably have prevented any internet use, since it allowed only an employer-provided desktop computer. It was oppressive and disproportionate. A proportionate order instead allowed ordinary internet use subject to notification, retained browsing history, inspection and monitoring safeguards.
3. The prohibitions concerning social websites, communication with persons under 18, lawful pornography and devices capable of recording images were imprecise, unnecessary or duplicative. The court deleted them. It accepted two replacement restrictions on living with, and unsupervised contact with, children, subject to social-services approval and specified exceptions. Although particular care is required with non-contact-with-children conditions, the evidence of risk and the appellant’s agreement made those provisions necessary and proportionate.
4. By section 103 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the appeal was treated as an appeal against sentence. Applying R v Thompson [2018] EWCA Crim 639, severity under section 11(3) of the Court of Appeal Act 1968 required assessment of the overall sentence. The substantially relaxed internet restrictions meant that the substituted order, even with the additional child-contact provisions, was less restrictive and did not breach section 11(3).
5. Although unnecessary to the outcome, the court construed section 114(4) of the Anti Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014 as preventing an extension of the duration of a SOPO or of its provisions, rather than preventing a variation which alters their substantive scope.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — in Connor v R [2019] EWCA Crim 234, the court allowed the appeal against the original SOPO, quashed it and substituted a fresh order.
• Isleworth Crown Court — on 27 February 2015, HHJ Moore imposed a ten-year SOPO alongside sentence.
• Isleworth Crown Court — an application to vary the order was refused in June 2016, as later established at a hearing in November 2017.