AB, R (on the application of) v Bristol City Council

Section 27 of the Children and Families Act 2014 gives local authorities substantial discretion as to how and when they keep special educational provision under review and consult interested parties. The court will intervene only where the authority’s approach is irrational. A strategic funding agreement does not automatically trigger a statutory review, particularly where its terms are high-level, implementation remains flexible, and individual statutory duties remain unaffected.

The public sector equality duty applies to high-level budgetary decisions, but the intensity of the required assessment depends on the decision’s stage, character and likely consequences. A decision-maker may defer detailed equality assessment until specific proposals are formulated where the earlier decision does not fix the eventual impact.

Three children with special educational needs brought judicial review claims against Bristol City Council and Devon County Council. The claims challenged decisions in March 2024 to enter into Safety Valve Agreements with the Department for Education concerning accumulated Dedicated Schools Grant deficits.

The claims alleged breach of the consultation duty in section 27(3) of the Children and Families Act 2014. The Devon claims additionally alleged breach of the public sector equality duty, failure to make reasonable inquiries, frustration of the statutory purpose of Part 3 of the 2014 Act, and adoption of a secret policy.

The central questions were whether the agreements triggered a mandatory strategic review and consultation, whether Devon had complied with its equality and inquiry duties, and whether entering into the agreement was otherwise unlawful.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. Section 27 requires local authorities to keep relevant educational, training and social care provision under review and to consult specified persons from time to time. It does not prescribe a particular trigger or impose consultation on a rolling basis whenever provision or funding changes.
2. The question whether an occasion requires a review or consultation is for the local authority, subject to Wednesbury review. The court rejected the submission that an alleged trigger event required the court itself to decide whether section 27 had been engaged. The authorities’ approach was consistent with R (Hollow) v Surrey County Council, R (ZK) v London Borough of Redbridge and R (D) v Hackney London Borough Council.
3. The Safety Valve Agreements contained high-level objectives rather than a binding commitment to the detailed projects or forecasts in the accompanying Deficit Management Plans. Their implementation remained flexible. Entering into the agreements did not authorise any failure to comply with individual duties under Part 3 of the 2014 Act, and any individual provision remained subject to the statutory framework and appeal rights.
4. It was rational for Bristol and Devon to conclude that a global section 27 review and consultation was unnecessary at that stage. Earlier engagement had addressed the relevant strategic objectives, detailed proposals would be consulted on when formulated, and the agreements themselves did not irrevocably determine future provision.
5. Ground 2 refused. The public sector equality duty applied to Devon’s decision. However, the required intensity of due regard depended on the decision’s place in the decision-making sequence and the fact that the agreement left substantial flexibility over implementation. It was lawful to defer detailed equality assessment until specific service changes were developed.
6. Ground 3 refused. Applying the Tameside principles, the Cabinet had sufficient information about the deficit, its causes, the scale of the challenge, the broad mitigation strategy and the agreement’s financial consequences. Further inquiries might have been desirable, but no reasonable authority would have been required to conclude that its inquiries were insufficient.
7. Grounds 4 and 5 refused. The court did not decide whether the Padfield principle could extend to the exercise of a power under one statute allegedly frustrating another. In any event, entering into the agreement did not or inevitably threaten to frustrate Part 3 of the 2014 Act. The alleged secret-policy challenge also failed.

The court dismissed Ground 1 and refused permission on Grounds 2 to 5. It expressed no concluded view on the procedural objections or relief.