Antigua and Barbuda Transport Board v Anderson Carty (Antigua and Barbuda)

Where legislation expressly authorises exemplary damages, common-law restrictions on exemplary damages do not add conditions to that statutory power. Under the Industrial Court Act, exemplary damages may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement where dismissal is harsh and oppressive or inconsistent with good industrial relations practice. The Industrial Court need not expressly address reinstatement before making the award. Its opinion on the statutory condition and its assessment of damages are final. Appeals cannot circumvent that finality by alleging an error of law. Costs remain subject to the exceptional-reasons threshold, and an appeal is unavailable unless a statutory ground is established.

The appellant, an Operations Manager employed by the respondent, was dismissed during a restructuring exercise. The Industrial Court found that the dismissal was not a genuine redundancy and was unfair. It awarded compensation, exemplary damages of $25,000 and costs of $2,500.

The Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court allowed the respondent’s appeal in part, set aside the exemplary-damages and costs awards, and allowed the appellant’s counter-appeal on loss of protection. The appeal to the Privy Council concerned whether the Court of Appeal had wrongly imposed common-law requirements for exemplary damages and whether it had jurisdiction to revisit either award.

Disposition. The Board advised that the appeal be allowed. The awards of $25,000 exemplary damages and $2,500 costs were reinstated.

1. Statutory power. The Industrial Court Act gives the Industrial Court a broad fairness-based jurisdiction. Under section 10(4), it may order re-employment or reinstatement, compensation or damages, or exemplary damages in lieu of re-employment or reinstatement. The statutory condition in section 10(5) is that the dismissal occurred in circumstances that were harsh and oppressive or contrary to good industrial relations practice.
2. No common-law gloss. The common-law limits identified in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 could not restrict an express statutory power. The Court of Appeal was therefore wrong to require oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional conduct, or some additional outrageous or calculatedly injurious conduct, before exemplary damages could be awarded.
3. Reinstatement. It was unnecessary for the Industrial Court expressly to address re-employment or reinstatement. The exemplary-damages power was available once the statutory condition was satisfied and no reinstatement or re-employment order was made. An order for reinstatement and exemplary damages could not be made together.
4. Finality and appellate jurisdiction. Section 17(1), read with section 17(4), restricts appeals from the Industrial Court to the specified statutory grounds and prevents collateral review. Section 10(6) is more specific: the Industrial Court’s opinion on the statutory condition, and its compensation or damages order and assessment, cannot be challenged or reviewed. The Board applied the reasoning in Sundry Workers v Antigua Hotel and Tourist Association [1993] 1 WLR 1250 and relied on the specialised finality recognised in Blackburn v LIAT (1974) Ltd [2020] UKPC 9. The Court of Appeal therefore had no jurisdiction to set aside the exemplary-damages award. The appellant could not confer jurisdiction by waiver.
5. Costs. The findings concerning the manner of dismissal constituted exceptional reasons under section 10(2), making the costs award a proper exercise of discretion. No ground in section 17(1) permitted the Court of Appeal to interfere with it.

1. Privy Council: In [2025] UKPC 38, the appeal was allowed and the awards of exemplary damages and costs were reinstated.
2. Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court: The respondent’s appeal was allowed in part. The awards of exemplary damages and costs were set aside, and the appellant’s counter-appeal concerning loss of protection was allowed.
3. Industrial Court of Antigua and Barbuda: The appellant was found to have been unfairly dismissed. Compensation, $25,000 exemplary damages and $2,500 costs were awarded.