Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Tobago House of Assembly (Trinidad and Tobago)

A statutory power to enter contracts must be read with the legislation’s financial-control scheme. A public body cannot use contractual form to evade provisions controlling expenditure, borrowing and public funds. A BOLT arrangement must be considered in substance as a financing structure for a capital project, rather than merely as a series of contracts. Where it commits the public body to substantial, long-term expenditure from a statutory fund without approval within the statutory scheme, it is outside the body’s powers.

The Tobago House of Assembly entered into a Build, Own, Lease, Transfer arrangement for an administrative complex. The Attorney General challenged its power to use the Tobago House of Assembly Fund for the arrangement outside the expenditure-control provisions of the Tobago House of Assembly Act.

Boodoosingh J held that the Assembly had power to enter into the arrangement without ministerial approval: CV 2013-00135. The Court of Appeal allowed the Attorney General’s appeal in Civil Appeal No P 169 of 2014, holding that the arrangement was outside the statutory framework. The issue before the Board was whether that decision was correct.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Board held that the Tobago House of Assembly was not empowered to enter into a BOLT arrangement funded from the Fund where the arrangement had not been approved within the statutory framework in Part IV of the Tobago House of Assembly Act.

2. Section 25(2) had to be interpreted in the context of the Act as a whole. The power to enter contracts under section 25(2)(b) did not authorise any arrangement capable of being divided into contracts. The substance of the arrangement had to be considered. A BOLT arrangement is a financial structure for funding a capital project.

3. The Part IV scheme subjects the Assembly’s revenue and expenditure to statutory control. The Assembly must submit estimates containing sufficient detail about proposed projects and their costs. The scheme is not a block-grant arrangement. Cabinet and, ultimately, Parliament must be able to assess the Assembly’s financial and developmental needs and the proposed expenditure.

4. The arrangement was not a term loan within section 51(b), but achieved a similar result indirectly. The contractor borrowed against the leasehold interest, while the Assembly provided security through the land and repaid the financing through rent. It was therefore akin to borrowing for capital projects and could not be used to circumvent the statutory requirement for ministerial approval.

5. The claimed power was neither necessary nor incidental because it was inconsistent with the statutory provisions controlling expenditure and finance. The Assembly could not commit the State to substantial, long-term liabilities from the Fund without the direction or control required by Part IV. The Board confined its decision to arrangements funded from the Fund and did not determine whether every BOLT arrangement, including one funded entirely by international grants, would be unlawful.

• Privy Council: in [2025] UKPC 8, the appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago was dismissed.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: in Civil Appeal No P 169 of 2014, the Attorney General’s appeal was allowed.
• High Court: in CV 2013-00135, Boodoosingh J held that the Tobago House of Assembly had power to enter into the BOLT arrangement without the consent or approval of the Minister of Finance.