D.E.L.T.A. Merseyside Limited and another v Uber Britannia Limited

Under Part II of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, a private hire vehicle operator may accept a booking without immediately contracting as principal to provide the journey. Section 56(1) instead deems any resulting contract of hire to have been made with the operator that accepted the booking, regardless of how, when or between whom that contract was actually made.

The statutory scheme regulates private hire services principally through vehicle, driver and operator licensing. A restriction on the parties’ freedom to choose their contractual arrangements requires clear statutory language or cogent justification. Neither the definition of operating nor the provisions governing subcontracting imply the asserted restriction. Requiring every operator to use the principal hire-contract model would also deprive section 56(1) of its substantive purpose.

Private hire vehicle operators outside London and Plymouth are regulated by Part II of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976. Uber Britannia Ltd sought a declaration that an operator could lawfully accept a booking only by immediately entering, as principal, into a contract to provide the booked journey. The respondent operators used agency or intermediary models under which the operator did not necessarily assume that immediate contractual obligation.

Foster J granted substantially the declaration sought in the High Court: [2023] EWHC 1975 (KB); [2024] 1 WLR 1350. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision: [2024] EWCA Civ 802; [2025] 1 WLR 245. The central issue was whether the 1976 Act prohibits an operator from accepting a booking otherwise than by contracting as principal to provide the journey.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Lord Briggs gave the judgment, with which Lord Reed, Lord Leggatt, Lord Stephens and Lady Simler agreed. Part II of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 does not require a private hire vehicle operator to enter immediately, as principal, into a contract to provide every journey for which it accepts a booking.

2. The 1976 Act establishes a scheme of regulation by licensing. The vehicle, driver and operator are each subject to a distinct licensing requirement. The statutory definition of “operate” confines the licensed activity to making provision, in the course of business, for the invitation or acceptance of bookings. Apart from record-keeping and licence-production duties, the Act does not prescribe how an operator must deal contractually with a person seeking a booking. Licensing authorities may impose appropriate conditions under section 55(3).

3. Section 56(1) is a deeming provision rather than a prohibition. When a contract for the hire of a licensed private hire vehicle is made, the provision deems that contract to have been made with the operator that accepted the booking. It therefore fixes the operator with contractual liability even where the operator acted as the driver’s agent, used an intermediary model, or passed the booking to another operator. It does not require a hire contract to arise immediately upon acceptance of the booking.

4. The construction advanced by Uber Britannia Ltd would make section 56(1) otiose. If the first operator were already required to contract as principal, it would incur liability at common law and the statutory deeming provision would perform no substantive function. The provision instead assumes that the contractual models existing when the Act was enacted could continue and supplies a catch-all means of imposing liability upon the booking operator for any ensuing hire.

5. Section 55A did not imply a different conclusion. Its references to subcontracting do not use that expression solely in its ordinary legal sense. The section was introduced as a deregulatory and permissive measure. Its reference to “the contract” does not necessarily mean a contract of hire and may include an intermediary’s contractual undertaking to use best endeavours.

6. The asserted prohibition could not be inferred from legislative purpose. A restriction on the freedom of operators, drivers and passengers to decide how, when and between whom to contract would require cogent justification and clear statutory expression. The Act pursues public safety principally through licensing and contains neither express language nor a sufficient implication imposing the proposed hire-contract model.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: The court unanimously dismissed Uber Britannia Ltd’s appeal and upheld the Court of Appeal’s construction of the statutory scheme: [2025] UKSC 31.
2. Court of Appeal: The court reversed the High Court’s decision and held that the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 did not compel operators to use the principal hire-contract model: [2024] EWCA Civ 802; [2025] 1 WLR 245.
3. High Court: Foster J granted substantially the declaration sought by Uber Britannia Ltd, holding that an operator had to accept a booking by entering as principal into the relevant contract of hire: [2023] EWHC 1975 (KB); [2024] 1 WLR 1350.