Case details
Summary
An appeal against a barring decision under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 succeeds only where the decision involved a material mistake of law or fact. The Upper Tribunal may make its own factual findings, but the statutory question whether barring is appropriate remains for the DBS. Evidence is not excluded merely because it may have been obtained without consent or through an allegedly unlawful recording. The central question is whether the evidence supports relevant conduct and whether any factual mistake materially affected the decision. Proportionality is assessed using the four-stage analysis required for interference with Article 8 rights. Where the statutory scheme gives the DBS no power to impose conditions or a limited bar, the Tribunal must assess proportionality against the available statutory options.
Factual background
The appellant appealed against the DBS decision of 28 March 2024 to include him on the adults’ barred list. The decision followed an incident while he was caring for ES, a vulnerable adult, which was recorded on video. The DBS relied on the recording and concluded that the appellant had threatened ES and handled her unsafely.
Permission to appeal was granted on arguable mistakes of fact or law, including proportionality. The central issues were whether the DBS had materially misstated the evidence, whether it was entitled to rely on the video, and whether inclusion on the barred list disproportionately interfered with the appellant’s Article 8 rights.
Held
- Appeal dismissed. The DBS decision to include the appellant on the Vulnerable Adults Barred List involved no material mistake of fact or law and was not disproportionate.
- The Upper Tribunal applied the approach summarised in PF v Disclosure and Barring Service [2020] UKUT 256 (AAC). It could consider all evidence, make its own factual findings and draw inferences. It was not confined to the evidence before the DBS, although the statutory appeal did not permit it to substitute its view on whether barring was appropriate.
- The Tribunal found that the appellant threatened ES and lifted her suddenly and unsafely. The accepted mistake concerning the timing of his response was immaterial because the threats and unsafe lifting independently supported the barring decision. The challenging circumstances, inadequate staffing and the appellant’s previous good record did not alter that conclusion.
- The DBS was entitled to rely on the video. Its safeguarding function was not governed by the evidential admissibility rules applicable in a court, and the provenance of the recording was irrelevant where the objective evidence was credible. Further investigation of ES or her daughter would not have altered the recording.
- Relevant conduct under Schedule 3 to the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 included conduct likely to endanger a vulnerable adult. Threatening to leave ES alone caused psychological harm, and the unsafe lifting created a risk of physical harm.
- Following KS v Disclosure and Barring Service [2025] UKUT 045 (AAC), the Tribunal applied the four-stage proportionality analysis identified in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700. Protecting vulnerable adults was sufficiently important; barring was rationally connected to that objective; and no less intrusive statutory measure was available because the DBS could not impose conditions, a temporary bar or a restricted form of regulated activity.
- The significant effect on the appellant’s work and livelihood did not outweigh the safeguarding objective. His firm refusal to recognise the risk of harm or say that he would act differently supported the conclusion that barring was proportionate and the only available statutory means of protection.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): [2025] UKUT 118 (AAC) dismissed the appeal and upheld the DBS decision dated 28 March 2024.
- Disclosure and Barring Service: included the appellant on the adults’ barred list. The judgment does not give a separate citation for that decision.
Key cases cited
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Cases citing this case
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