Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, R (on the application of) v First-Tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber)

Eligibility for compensation after an animal attack requires a crime, a crime of violence under Annex B to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012, and satisfaction of the animal-attack exception. A strict-liability offence under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 cannot itself constitute a crime of violence because the relevant act or omission must form part of an offence done intentionally or recklessly. For an animal attack, recklessness is insufficient: the animal must have been used with intent to cause injury. A tribunal must explain, by reference to the evidence, why the defendant’s aim or purpose was to cause injury. Knowledge of an animal’s dangerous propensity and failure to control it may establish recklessness, but do not necessarily establish intent.

The Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority challenged the First-tier Tribunal’s decision of 4 March 2024, with written reasons dated 13 June 2024. The FTT had allowed a claim by a woman injured when an Alsatian dog bit her and caused her to fall, finding that the owner and dog walker had committed an offence under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 and that the offence was a crime of violence under the 2012 Scheme.

The Upper Tribunal considered whether the FTT had identified an offence capable of being a crime of violence, whether it had applied the staged requirements in Annex B, whether it had distinguished intent from recklessness, and whether its finding that the dog was used with intent to cause injury was adequately reasoned.

1. Judicial review allowed. The FTT’s decision was quashed and the appeal was remitted for a fresh decision by an entirely differently constituted FTT, at an oral hearing.
2. Annex B requires a sequential inquiry: whether a crime was committed; whether it was a crime of violence under paragraph 2 (subject to paragraph 3); and whether paragraph 4 excludes the injury because it resulted from an animal attack. The paragraph 4 exception does not replace the requirement to establish a crime of violence.
3. The FTT identified the offence as one under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. Following R v Bezzina [1994] 1 WLR 1057, that offence is one of strict liability. It therefore does not involve an act or omission done intentionally or recklessly and cannot constitute a crime of violence under paragraph 2 of Annex B.
4. The FTT also failed to show that it had addressed paragraph 2 of Annex B before considering the animal-attack exception. Its error was material because it had not considered whether another offence, including one under section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, could be established.
5. The FTT did not misdirect itself by recognising that the case presented a borderline distinction between intent and recklessness. Under CICA v First-tier Tribunal and AS [2017] UKUT 43 (AAC), intent under the Scheme bears its ordinary meaning, focusing on the person’s aim or purpose. Criminal authorities may assist only insofar as they illuminate that meaning.
6. The FTT nevertheless failed to explain why the dog walker’s or owner’s aim or purpose was to use the dog to cause injury. The dog’s aggression, the defendants’ knowledge of it, and the failure to muzzle or control it could establish recklessness, but did not necessarily establish intent. The reasons therefore disclosed a material error of law.

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): granted judicial review of the FTT decision of 4 March 2024, with written reasons dated 13 June 2024. The decision was quashed and the appeal remitted for rehearing by a fresh tribunal.
• First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber): allowed the claimant’s appeal under the 2012 Scheme on 4 March 2024.