DB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Ors

For the child-support scheme, whether a parent provides “day to day care” to a lesser extent is a question of fact. The tribunal must assess the overall pattern of hands-on, immediate and ordinary care from the evidence as a whole. It must avoid replacing fact-finding with value judgments or simply counting hours.

Findings must be tied to the relevant decision dates. Reasons must identify the issues, explain how material evidence and conflicts were assessed, state the material facts found, identify the legal tests applied, and explain why the conclusion follows. A bare statement of the result is inadequate.

The Father and Mother were involved in linked appeals concerning child-maintenance liability under the Child Support Act 1991. The First-tier Tribunal allowed the Mother’s appeal against the closure of the 2020 maintenance claim and allowed the Father’s appeal concerning the later supersession decision, concluding that the Father had the lesser share of day-to-day care.

The Father appealed to the Upper Tribunal. The central issues were whether the First-tier Tribunal had made adequate findings about the parents’ respective care at the relevant dates and whether it had given adequate reasons for its conclusions.

1. Appeals allowed. The First-tier Tribunal’s decisions involved errors of law. They were set aside under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, and the cases were remitted to a fresh First-tier Tribunal for an oral rehearing.
2. Under regulation 50 of the Child Support Maintenance Calculation Regulations 2012, the tribunal must decide as a question of fact whether the parent named as the non-resident parent provides day-to-day care to a lesser extent than the applicant. “Day to day care” has no statutory definition. The assessment concerns hands-on, immediate, short-term and mundane care, and requires an evaluation of the overall pattern of care. It is not a mechanical calculation of hours.
3. The evaluation must rest on findings of fact rooted in evidence, rather than value judgments about the parents’ values, philosophies or motivations. Details may matter, but the tribunal must consider the evidence as a whole. Where the evidence is conflicting, the tribunal must say how the conflict was resolved.
4. The First-tier Tribunal’s reasons did not clearly distinguish findings from summaries of the parents’ evidence. They did not resolve material conflicts, including who paid for gymnastics, did not engage with relevant documentary evidence, and did not anchor the findings to the dates relevant to the 2020 and 2022 decisions. The evidence about school-meal arrears also related to a later period and could not adequately establish the position at the earlier relevant date.
5. The reasons for the second appeal merely stated the outcome and gave no reasons. Adequate reasons must identify the issues, explain the assessment of material evidence, state the material facts and their relevant dates, identify the legal tests applied, and explain why the facts led to the result. The Upper Tribunal also endorsed the guidance on adequacy in South Bucks DC v Porter (No.2) [2004] UKHL 33.
6. The cases were remitted to a new tribunal, which was not bound by the previous decision. Any further evidence had to concern circumstances existing at the dates of the Secretary of State’s decisions.

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): appeals allowed; the First-tier Tribunal decisions dated 17 October 2023 were set aside for error of law and remitted for rehearing by a fresh tribunal.
• First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber): on 17 October 2023, allowed the Mother’s appeal against the 2020 decision and allowed the Father’s appeal against the 2022 decision, remaking the latter decision.