Transport for London v Cairn Young & Anor

A highway authority which positively creates or materially contributes to a highway danger owes road users a duty to take reasonable care. The duty may extend to users whose inattention or negligence contributes to an accident. It differs from any general duty to improve a highway or warn of ordinary hazards.

Foreseeability of injury, even with an available precaution, does not itself establish breach. The court must assess the magnitude of the risk, likely seriousness of harm, design purpose, guidance, accident history, professional judgment, and the practicality and consequences of further measures.

Two experienced cyclists were injured at night after their bicycles struck a raised kerb separating a stepped cycle track from the carriageway on Farringdon Road. Each had mistaken the pale kerb for a white lane marking and attempted to enter the track from the carriageway.

At a joint County Court trial, HHJ Hellman held the highway authority liable. He found that installing wands along the kerb would have been a reasonable precaution. He reduced damages for contributory negligence by 70% for Mr Young and 65% for Mr Upitis.

The authority appealed. The central issue was whether the judge had properly evaluated breach of the duty of reasonable care arising from the design and construction of the cycle track.

1. The appeals were allowed. The findings of liability and consequential decisions were set aside. Both claims were remitted for a fresh hearing before a different Circuit Judge, with no findings preserved and all issues, including contributory negligence, at large.

2. A highway authority which positively creates or materially contributes to a danger may owe ordinary common-law duties of reasonable care. That duty is distinct from a general duty to improve a highway or warn of its ordinary features. Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057 and Yetkin v Mahmood & London Borough of Newham [2010] EWCA Civ 776 were consistent applications of that distinction.

3. The duty was owed to all road users, not only careful cyclists. A cyclist’s inattention did not negate the duty, although it could bear on breach, causation and contributory negligence. The trial judge was therefore entitled to find a foreseeable risk that cyclists could mistake this particular kerb for a painted line.

4. The judge nevertheless erred by treating foreseeability and an available precaution as sufficient to establish breach. Reasonable care did not require protection against every foreseeable error. The required assessment had to weigh the scale of the risk, gravity of injury, purpose and recognised design context of the facility, relevant guidance and audits, accident history, and the cost, practicality, effectiveness and disadvantages of proposed measures. This reflected the approach in Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46.

5. The wands allegation was within the pleaded case and was fairly explored in evidence. However, the trial judge had not carried out the necessary full evaluative exercise before deciding that their installation was required. The Court of Appeal could not fairly substitute its own assessment because risk, design, remedial measures, causation and contributory negligence required reconsideration together.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — In Transport for London v Cairn Young & Anor [2026] EWCA Civ 1095 , the court allowed the appeals, set aside liability findings, and remitted both claims for a fresh hearing.
• Central London at the Mayor's and City Court — HHJ Hellman found the highway authority liable for both cycling accidents and made reductions for contributory negligence of 70% and 65% respectively.