Diogo Santos Coelho, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Under Extradition Act 2003, section 179 requires the Secretary of State to choose priority between competing extradition claims by reference to matters concerning the claims, the requesting states and the United Kingdom’s treaty obligations. The requested person’s comparative personal interests are not relevant considerations. The statutory scheme displaces, by necessary implication, any common-law right to make representations before that administrative priority decision.

Human-rights objections remain for the extradition process and judicial safeguards. A priority decision must, however, rest on an accurate factual basis. A material error which prevents the decision-maker from assessing the comparative seriousness of the competing allegations justifies quashing the decision and reconsideration.

The respondent, a Portuguese national, was subject to competing extradition claims from the United States and Portugal concerning alleged cybercrime connected with RaidForums. The Secretary of State deferred the Portuguese Part 1 proceedings in favour of the United States Part 2 request under section 179 of the Extradition Act 2003.

Linden J allowed the respondent’s judicial-review claim, holding that the decision was procedurally unfair, involved material factual errors and was irrational. He quashed it and required reconsideration: [2025] EWHC 2293 (Admin). The Secretary of State appealed.

The Court of Appeal considered whether it had jurisdiction, whether fairness required representations from the requested person before a section 179 priority decision, whether the person’s interests were relevant to that decision, and whether the factual errors remained material.

1. The appeal was allowed in part. The Court allowed Grounds 1 and 2, but dismissed Ground 3. The priority decision remained quashed because a material factual error required a fresh decision.

2. The Court had jurisdiction. Applying the approach in In re McGuinness [2020] UKSC 6, a decision under section 179 is an administrative and collateral choice between two otherwise lawful extradition claims. Its direct outcome is not the requested person’s trial or punishment. It is therefore not a judgment in a criminal cause or matter for section 18(1)(a) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

3. Section 179 does not require the Secretary of State to consider the requested person’s personal interests, including comparative welfare, support, prison conditions or sentencing consequences in the two states. Although the statutory factors are non-exhaustive, their subject matter concerns the competing claims, the interests of the states and treaty obligations. Human-rights compatibility is addressed through the extradition process, not by the executive priority decision.

4. The common-law duty of fairness did not require an opportunity to make representations before the section 179 decision. The deliberately prescriptive and expedited scheme of the Extradition Act 2003, including its limited and time-bound provision for representations in section 93, displaced such a right by necessary implication. The Court explained that OP v Procureur de la République did not require a different result, because domestic extradition procedures provide judicial protection against unlawful removal.

5. The Minister was wrongly told that the allegations in the two claims were identical. The Portuguese warrant contained additional money-laundering and tax allegations and disclosed further connections with Portugal. That error deprived the Minister of the opportunity to assess the relative seriousness of the claims. The Court did not decide which claim was more serious; that evaluative judgment belongs to the decision-maker. A fresh decision must be made on an accurate factual basis and without any legal obligation to receive or consider representations on the respondent’s personal interests.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal on procedural fairness and relevance of personal interests, but dismissed the appeal on the material factual-error ground: [2026] EWCA Civ 1219 .
• High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court Linden J allowed judicial review, quashed the section 179 priority decision and remitted it for reconsideration: [2025] EWHC 2293 (Admin) .