AM & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In a protection appeal, a global credibility assessment must not obscure the factual findings required on the core elements said to establish risk on return. The tribunal must identify the principal controversial issues, marshal the evidence relevant to them, and give intelligible reasons for accepting or rejecting the evidence determinative of those issues. Credibility findings about matters remote from the alleged risk may assist the assessment of the core account, but they do not replace findings on the essential facts or an explanation of why the risk is not established to the applicable lower standard of proof. A decision is legally insufficient where a well-informed reader cannot discern which key elements were accepted, which were rejected, and why the accepted facts did not establish a reasonable degree of likelihood of persecution.

AM, an Iraqi Kurdish national, claimed asylum for herself and her daughter, FM, on the basis that her maternal cousin threatened honour-based violence after she rejected an arranged marriage to him and married D. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal against the refusal of the asylum claim, relying on credibility concerns concerning matters including travel through France, identity documents, alleged threats to AM’s mother and assistance from D’s uncle. The Upper Tribunal dismissed an appeal alleging irrationality and inadequate treatment of D’s evidence.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the First-tier Tribunal had failed to make findings on the factual elements said to give rise to the claimed risk, and whether it had sufficiently addressed D’s first-hand evidence.

1. Appeal allowed. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision contained an error of law and the case was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by a different tribunal. The Upper Tribunal consequently erred in dismissing the appeal.
2. In accordance with SSHD v TC [2023] UKUT 164 (IAC), the tribunal had to identify the principal important controversial issues, marshal the evidence bearing on them, and give intelligible reasons for accepting or rejecting the evidence determinative of those issues. The central issue was whether there was a reasonable degree of likelihood of honour-based violence to AM or FM on return to Iraq. That required findings on the factual elements said to underpin the fear, including the alleged arranged marriage, the cousin’s return, threats, the armed incident, the police complaint and the cousin’s KDP affiliation.
3. A credibility assessment remains global and must be taken in the round. Matters such as threats to AM’s mother, D’s uncle’s assistance and identity documents were not necessarily separate from the central risk assessment. Under SB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 160 at [42], conclusions about matters remote from the indicia of risk may assist in determining whether the core account is credible. They cannot, however, substitute for findings on the core elements or a clear explanation of the resulting risk.
4. The First-tier Tribunal’s conditional language and conclusion that some key aspects might be true left the reasoning chain incomplete. A well-informed reader could not determine which elements were accepted or rejected, or why any accepted key elements did not establish the claimed risk to the lower standard of proof. The judge’s responsibility to identify the issues correctly remained his, notwithstanding the parties’ characterisation of the case as one solely about credibility.
5. The treatment of D’s evidence was also legally inadequate. Although a judge need not address every piece of evidence, D gave first-hand evidence of events before the family left Iraq. The sparse and equivocal reference to his evidence did not reveal which parts of his evidence on the essential elements were rejected or implicitly accepted. The principle in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48, did not justify the omission of material reasoning.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the Upper Tribunal allowed on both grounds; the case was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing by a different tribunal.
• Upper Tribunal: On 13 March 2025, dismissed the appeal from the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and subsequently refused permission to appeal on 2 April 2025.
• First-tier Tribunal: On 9 September 2024, dismissed the appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of the asylum claim.