A, B and C (Children: Perpetrator Finding), Re

In care proceedings, the Court of Appeal will not rehear evidence or interfere with a first-instance perpetrator finding unless there is a very clear justification. Where the judge has assessed witness reliability carefully and with nuance, appellate disagreement about weight, inconsistencies or propensity evidence is insufficient. Similar-fact authorities primarily concern admissibility; in family proceedings admissibility rules are generally less restrictive, so the central question is the weight of the evidence within the overall evaluation. A judge who identifies the perpetrator on the balance of probabilities need not undertake a further pool-of-perpetrators analysis. Reasons must show the legal principles applied and the path to the decision, but need not address every argument or be elaborate.

These care proceedings concerned three boys. The Family Court at Portsmouth found that the mother had caused an incomplete fracture to the left humerus of the youngest child, C, and had failed to obtain prompt medical attention. The judge found that either parent could have inflicted the injury, but concluded on the balance of probabilities that the mother was responsible. She could not determine whether the injury occurred before or after contact with the father.

The mother appealed, challenging the assessment of witness evidence, the treatment of evidence suggesting the father’s propensity for anger and violence, the failure to undertake a pool-of-perpetrators analysis, and the adequacy of the judge’s reasons. The central issue was whether the judge’s finding that the mother was the perpetrator disclosed an error of law or a sufficiently clear error in the evaluation of the evidence.

Appeal dismissed. Baker LJ gave the judgment of the court. Arnold LJ agreed with his reasons, and Dove LJ agreed with both judgments.

1. The assessment of evidence and the weight given to individual pieces of evidence were matters for the trial judge. An appeal court does not conduct a rehearing and should not interfere with factual findings without a very clear justification. The case depended substantially on the judge’s assessment of witness reliability. Her treatment of the witnesses was careful, considered and nuanced. There was no basis for interfering with her conclusion that the mother caused the fracture.
2. The judge had properly considered the wider evidential canvas. The unchallenged medical evidence established a non-accidental injury, but did not identify the perpetrator. The judge was entitled to regard the mother’s inconsistent accounts of when she noticed the injury, and her failure to follow advice, contact the father or alert the social worker, as relevant to her reliability. The judge also considered the evidence of the father’s anger and aggression. That evidence was capable of supporting a finding against him, but the judge was entitled, on the totality of the evidence, to reach a different conclusion.
3. The authorities on similar-fact evidence cited by the appellant, including R v Mitchell [2016] UKSC 55 and R v P (Children: Similar Fact Evidence) [2020] EWCA Civ 1088, concerned principally admissibility. In family proceedings admissibility rules are generally less strict, and the crucial question was the weight to be attached to the evidence. Those authorities did not assist the appellant on the issue before the court.
4. Once the judge had identified the perpetrator on the balance of probabilities, she was not required to engage further with the principles concerning a pool of possible perpetrators. Her reasons met the standard explained in Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5: they identified the crucial legal points and gave sufficient reasons for the decision, without needing to address every argument or be elaborate.

Arnold LJ added that a chronological analysis of the evidence might have assisted the judge in determining the timing of the injury, which was related to the identity of the perpetrator. That observation did not undermine the finding or justify appellate intervention.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was granted on 13 January 2026. The appeal against the perpetrator finding was dismissed.
• Family Court at Portsmouth: Following a fact-finding hearing, judgment was handed down on 22 August 2025. The judge found on the balance of probabilities that the mother had caused C’s fracture. Permission to appeal was refused on 12 September 2025.