Epping Forest District Council v Somani Hotels Limited

Under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the court must make its own assessment of whether an injunction is appropriate to restrain a breach of planning control. It should consider planning and environmental harm, the seriousness and flagrancy of the breach, enforcement history, and countervailing public and private interests. The local planning authority’s decision that an application is necessary or expedient is not re-assessed, but the considerations informing that decision may be examined. The court may refuse an injunction where conventional enforcement has not been tried and the remedy would be disproportionate. Public protest and community tension cannot themselves justify using planning proceedings to regulate public order. A declaration should not be granted where it would usurp functions allocated to the planning authority and a planning inspector.

Epping Forest District Council, the local planning authority, sought an injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to restrain Somani Hotels Limited from using the Bell Hotel to accommodate asylum seekers. The Council also sought a declaration that the use was outside the hotel’s lawful planning use. Mr Justice Mould dismissed the claim and awarded costs to Somani and the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The Council sought permission to appeal, challenging the judge’s treatment of the alleged breach, the discretionary refusal of an injunction, and the costs orders. The Secretary of State and Clearsprings Ready Homes Limited intervened. The central issues were whether the proposed grounds had a real prospect of success and whether there was any other compelling reason for an appeal to be heard.

1. Permission and injunction principles. The application for permission to appeal was refused. The judge had not failed to determine whether there was a material change of use. He had assumed, in the Council’s favour, that the use involved a breach of planning control, and then decided that an injunction would not be just and convenient or a commensurate remedy.
2. Under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the local planning authority decides whether it is necessary or expedient to seek an injunction. The court does not re-assess that judgment, but may consider the factors relied upon by the authority, together with the degree of planning and environmental harm, the seriousness and flagrancy of the breach, the enforcement history, and public and private interests bearing on whether an injunction is appropriate. The judge was entitled to give significant weight to the continuing need for hotel accommodation to discharge the Secretary of State’s statutory duties towards asylum seekers, and some weight to the effect on the hotel owner’s income and investment.
3. The distinction between hotel and hostel use remains fine and fact-sensitive. A material-change-of-use threshold issue must be kept separate from the assessment of harm and the commensurateness of an injunction. The judge was entitled to assume the threshold issue without making findings on every factor said to bear upon it, because the additional findings would not have affected his detailed assessment of harm.
4. Community tensions and protests could be considered as part of the evidence, but planning control is directed to planning and environmental harm. The fact of protest could not justify an injunction under section 187B to regulate protest or public order; other public authorities possess powers for that purpose.
5. The declaration was properly refused. It would not serve a useful purpose and would effectively usurp functions allocated to the local planning authority and a planning inspector on an enforcement-notice appeal.
6. As to costs, the judge correctly applied the principles in Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment. The Secretary of State had a separate identifiable interest and raised a separate issue because the injunction would affect her statutory duties, and she was entitled to separate representation and her costs. The complaint concerning the payment on account of Somani’s costs had no realistic prospect of success: objections could be raised on detailed assessment, and EFDC had not sought further time to respond to the costs schedule.

There was no other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): permission to appeal the orders of Mr Justice Mould was refused.
• High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division: Mr Justice Mould dismissed EFDC’s final claim and made consequential costs orders in [2025] EWHC 2937 (KB).
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): in an earlier appeal concerning the interim injunction and joinder of the Secretary of State, the court allowed both appeals, joined the Secretary of State as a party and discharged the interim injunction in [2025] EWCA Civ 1134.
• High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division: Eyre J had granted an interim injunction in [2025] EWHC 2183 (KB).