Epping Forest District Council v Somani Hotels Limited

An injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is discretionary. The court must decide whether it is just and convenient, and whether an injunction is a commensurate remedy.

The court must not reassess the planning merits or substitute its own planning judgment. It may, however, consider the planning history, the degree of environmental harm, urgency, the effectiveness of ordinary enforcement methods and countervailing factors. Public controversy and protests do not themselves establish planning harm. Fear of crime may be material where it has a reasonable evidential basis and arises from the character of the land use rather than isolated acts by particular individuals.

Epping Forest District Council sought a final injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 restraining Somani Hotels Limited from using the Bell Hotel to accommodate asylum seekers. It also sought a declaration that the use was not hotel use within Class C1.

The Council alleged that the use had materially changed from a hotel to a hostel and that the unauthorised use caused planning and environmental harm, including pressure on local services, fear of crime and community tensions. The Defendant disputed both the alleged breach and the appropriateness of an injunction. The Home Secretary and Clearsprings Ready Homes Limited intervened.

The central issues were whether there was a reasonable basis for alleging a breach of planning control, whether the Council’s decision to seek an injunction was procedurally and substantively sound, and whether injunctive relief was just, convenient and commensurate.

1. Alleged breach. The distinction between hotel and hostel use is fine and fact-sensitive. Whether a material change of use has occurred is a question of fact and degree. The court accepted that the Council had at least a reasonable basis for alleging that the Bell’s exclusive use for asylum accommodation was a material change requiring planning permission. It did not finally determine that planning issue.
2. Decision to seek an injunction. The Council’s decision was affected by serious procedural shortcomings. It failed to make the contemporaneous record required by its Scheme of Delegation, did not properly record the reasons for the delegated decision, and did not notify or consult the Defendant or the Home Secretary about the proposed enforcement action. Those failures caused real prejudice and created uncertainty about the matters considered.
3. Applicable approach. Applying South Bucks District Council v Porter, the court considered the planning history, the absence of prior conventional enforcement, the non-flagrant nature of the alleged breach, the degree and duration of environmental harm, urgency, and countervailing factors. The court must not reassess the planning judgment, but must make its own judgment whether an injunction is just and convenient.
4. Planning and environmental harm. The security fencing caused localised and probably temporary visual harm to the Green Belt and conservation area. The loss of visitor accommodation was tempered by the temporary nature of the use and its potential to support the hotel’s longer-term viability. There was insufficient evidence of undue pressure on local services. Fear of crime had a reasonable basis, but the evidence concerned three individuals and did not establish a pattern characteristic of asylum accommodation. Protests and disorder were principally matters for public-order law and did not themselves constitute planning harm.
5. Countervailing factors and outcome. There was significant evidence of a continuing need for hotel contingency accommodation to enable the Home Secretary to discharge statutory duties under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The impact on the Defendant’s business also carried weight. The alleged breach was not flagrant, ordinary enforcement had not been tried, and the harm was limited. An injunction was therefore not a commensurate remedy. The injunction application and the application for declaratory relief were dismissed. The Council remained free to consider ordinary enforcement action, while the Defendant could seek retrospective permission or a certificate of lawfulness.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): The final injunction and declaration were refused. The claim was dismissed.
• Court of Appeal: An earlier interim injunction was discharged and the Home Secretary was joined as an intervener: [2025] EWCA Civ 1134. That decision concerned interlocutory relief in the same litigation and is not a judgment appealed in the present claim.