Matthew James Pringle v Olivia Margaret Nervo

In children proceedings, a costs order remains unusual. It is justified only where a party has behaved reprehensibly or adopted a stance beyond the range of what is reasonable in relation to the litigation. The court must assess the whole course of the proceedings and the conduct of both parties.

Ordinary procedural shortcomings, including late decisions, will not ordinarily meet that demanding threshold. Historic conduct which may be relevant to the child’s welfare does not itself justify a costs order. Matters relevant to the amount of costs may also be material when deciding whether any costs order should be made.

The father appealed against a costs order made in private law proceedings under the Children Act 1989 concerning the parties’ daughter. The Family Court ordered him to pay £385,587, representing 75% of the mother’s costs.

The judge held that the father’s partial privacy motivation, late withdrawal of his applications, non-attendance at two hearings, and late procedural steps amounted to unreasonable conduct. The father contended that the judge had not considered the litigation as a whole or the mother’s conduct, including her unsuccessful and renewed pursuit of a fact-finding hearing.

The central issue was whether those matters justified departing from the usual no-costs approach in children proceedings.

1. The appeal was allowed unanimously. The order requiring the father to pay 75% of the mother’s costs was set aside and replaced with no order as to costs, save for the conceded costs of preparing the mother’s declaration-of-parentage application.

2. The applicable rule is that costs are not ordinarily awarded in proceedings concerning children. Under Re T and Re S, an order is justified only in unusual circumstances, including reprehensible conduct or a stance beyond the bounds of reasonableness. The distinction between describing the circumstances as “unusual” or “exceptional” has no practical significance. The court followed the simple, flexible and well-established approach stated in Re E.

3. When deciding whether to make any order under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 44.2, the court had to consider all the circumstances, including the conduct of both parties. The first-instance judge erred by considering only the father’s conduct. He should also have considered the mother’s failed fact-finding application, her attempt to renew it after it had been refused, the effect of her pursuit of publicity upon the child’s relationship with the paternal family, and the father’s success on the contested issues.

4. The father’s partial wish for privacy, inferred from limited correspondence, could not materially support a costs order. Nor did his late withdrawal, medically supported failure to attend two submissions-only hearings, late concession to a section 91(14) order, or unsuccessful application to adduce evidence approach the required degree of unreasonable conduct. Such low-level procedural conduct is too common in emotive private children proceedings to justify routine costs orders.

5. The relevant conduct is conduct in the pre-proceedings and proceedings, not the father’s earlier deceitful and emotionally abusive conduct towards the mother. That conduct could be relevant to welfare where contact was disputed, but it was not a basis for costs in this case.

6. The father must pay the mother’s costs of preparing the declaration-of-parentage application on the standard basis, to be assessed if not agreed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — allowed the father’s appeal and substituted no order as to costs, save for the declaration-of-parentage application: [2026] EWCA Civ 266.
• Family Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice — Deputy High Court Judge Nicholas Allen KC made a costs order dated 8 May 2025 requiring the father to pay 75% of the mother’s costs.