Lino Di Maria, R (on the application of) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

The police vetting test is distinct from misconduct proceedings. A finding of “no case to answer” or that misconduct was not proved on the balance of probabilities does not, without more, eliminate reasonable grounds for suspicion in a later vetting review.

Vetting is a multifactorial assessment of future risk. It may consider unproved allegations and information that would not establish misconduct, provided there is an objective evidential basis and the decision is not speculative. A vetting authority is not required to make findings of fact on the balance of probabilities before assessing risk.

Misconduct proceedings have temporal priority where appropriate, but no substantive primacy. A new matter arising during a vetting review may be considered within the risk assessment without an automatic pause.

This was an appeal by the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis from the Administrative Court’s judgment, reported at [2025] EWHC 275 (Admin). The Respondent’s police vetting had been withdrawn after several allegations, none of which had resulted in a criminal conviction or a misconduct finding.

The Administrative Court allowed the judicial review on Grounds 1 to 4 and quashed the withdrawal and referral to a third-stage performance meeting. The live appeal concerned the finding that, after a misconduct investigation ended with no case to answer or no proved misconduct, a vetting review could not ordinarily find reasonable grounds for suspicion unless exceptional circumstances existed.

The Court of Appeal also considered jurisdiction and whether to hear the otherwise academic public-law appeal following the enactment of the Police (Vetting) Regulations 2025.

Appeal allowed unanimously. The Court had jurisdiction because the appeal challenged the operative part of the formal order allowing judicial review on Ground 3, not merely the judge’s reasons. The quashing order itself remained unaffected because it was independently supported by other grounds.

1. Although the Respondent’s vetting status had expired and the issue was therefore academic between the parties, the Court exercised its discretion to hear the appeal. The point was fully argued, likely to affect other cases, and important to public confidence in policing. This followed the public-law approach in Salem and the analogous reasoning in Dolan.
2. The Judge correctly interpreted the “adverse information” limb of the Vetting Code. It requires information capable of satisfying an objective observer that the officer may have committed the acts alleged, rather than the mere existence of adverse information.
3. The Judge nevertheless erred in treating a finding of no case to answer, or that misconduct had not been proved, as ordinarily negating reasonable grounds for suspicion. Such findings apply the balance of probabilities. Reasonable suspicion is a materially lower threshold and is not equivalent to prima facie proof. The two regimes also differ in purpose, decision-maker, admissible material and function: misconduct proceedings determine whether past misconduct is proved, whereas vetting assesses future risk.
4. A vetting decision-maker may assess the possibility that unproved allegations are true, together with other information, as part of a cumulative risk assessment. No particular event must first be proved on the balance of probabilities. The assessment must nevertheless have a basis in objective evidence and cannot rest on speculation.
5. Misconduct proceedings may have temporal priority, but they have no substantive primacy over vetting. A new matter arising during a vetting review need not automatically trigger a pause for misconduct proceedings and may be considered as part of the multifactorial risk assessment. The Court expressed no view on the meaning or effect of the 2025 Regulations.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2026] EWCA Civ 28 , the appeal was allowed on the live issue concerning the interpretation of the Vetting Code. The existing quashing order remained unaffected.
2. High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: In [2025] EWHC 275 (Admin) , the claim for judicial review was allowed on Grounds 1 to 4. The decisions withdrawing minimum vetting clearance and referring the officer to a third-stage meeting were quashed.