Manchester City Council v Naila Tabbasam

[2026] EWCA Civ 361

Case details

Case citations
[2026] EWCA Civ 361
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
26 March 2026
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative Housing law Reasonable excuse defence
Keywords
reasonable excuse improvement notice valid service non-receipt of notice registered proprietor Land Registry address for service Housing Act 2004 financial penalty second appeal HMO licensing
Outcome
appeal dismissed (unanimous)
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Valid service of an improvement notice does not create deemed knowledge of it. Actual non-receipt may support a reasonable-excuse defence under section 30(4) of the Housing Act 2004, assessed objectively and in all the circumstances. A landlord’s own fault or administrative omission is not an automatic bar. An address for service at a tenanted property is not necessarily wrongful merely because it is not the landlord’s home address. Authorities concerned only with effective service, or with different statutory duties such as HMO licensing, do not displace that analysis. The appeal was dismissed.

Factual background

Manchester City Council served an improvement notice on a landlord at the address for service recorded in the proprietorship register and at a former council-tax address. The landlord did not receive the notice because she no longer lived at the latter address and the tenants did not forward correspondence.

The First-tier Tribunal found a validly served offence under the Housing Act 2004 and imposed a reduced financial penalty of £15,000. The Upper Tribunal allowed the landlord’s appeal, finding that she had a reasonable excuse. The Council brought a second appeal concerning the relationship between valid service, non-receipt and the statutory reasonable-excuse defence.

Held

  1. Disposition. Zacaroli LJ dismissed the appeal. Dove and Falk LJJ agreed, making the decision unanimous.
  2. Second appeal. The Court’s task was to determine whether the Upper Tribunal had erred in law in setting aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision or in remaking the decision. The First-tier Tribunal had adopted an inflexible proposition that a landlord could never rely on her own default in maintaining address details. That was an error of law.
  3. Service and reasonable excuse. Under section 30(1) and section 30(4) of the Housing Act 2004, valid service of an operative improvement notice and the defence of reasonable excuse are distinct questions. Section 233 of the Local Government Act 1972 may make service effective without actual receipt, but it does not prevent the recipient relying on non-receipt in support of a reasonable-excuse defence.
  4. Applicable assessment. Reasonable excuse is highly fact-specific and is assessed objectively, taking account of the person’s relevant experience, attributes and situation. An own default, fault or administrative omission is not automatically disqualifying.
  5. Authorities. Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council v Tanna [2017] EWCA Civ 50 concerned effective service, not reasonable excuse. The service cases relied on by the Council, including Serpes v City of London [2017] EWHC 11241 (Ch), Rushmoor Borough Council v Reynolds (1991) 23 HLR 495 and Birmingham City Council v Bravington [2023] EWCA Civ 308, likewise did not involve a statutory reasonable-excuse defence. The HMO-licensing authorities did not govern a case involving non-receipt of the notice.
  6. Application. Rule 198 of the Land Registration Rules 2003 did not require the registered address to be residential. Giving the tenanted property as the address for correspondence was not necessarily wrongful, and the failure to update it did not automatically defeat the defence. No obligation to maintain a current council-tax address was established, particularly since no information request under section 16 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 had been made.
  7. The Upper Tribunal was entitled to find that the landlord had a reasonable excuse because she never received the improvement notice. The appeal was dismissed.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2026] EWCA Civ 361, the Court dismissed the Council’s second appeal and upheld the Upper Tribunal’s finding that the landlord had a reasonable excuse.
  2. Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber): On 10 April 2024, Upper Tribunal Judge Cooke allowed the landlord’s appeal from the First-tier Tribunal and substituted a finding of reasonable excuse. No neutral citation is stated in the judgment.
  3. First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber): On 22 May 2023, the Tribunal found that the improvement notice had been validly served, found an offence under the Housing Act 2004, and imposed a £15,000 financial penalty.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal dismissed (unanimous)

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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