Gijsbert Lucas Van Buuren v The Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire Constabulary & Ors

At the summary-judgment stage, judgment should be refused where the material discloses triable legal and factual issues and it cannot be said that a fair trial is impossible. Long delay, fading memories and evidential gaps are relevant, but do not alone establish that the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim. An exiguous defence should not be struck out if it is not improper and disclosure may clarify the issues. An appellate court should not ordinarily manage first-instance litigation, but may order prompt directions where substantial delay makes expedition imperative.

The claimant alleged that police forces and the Independent Office for Police Conduct had concealed a collision in which he was injured, falsified investigative records and acted in misfeasance in public office. He also claimed psychiatric injury. His complaint had previously been investigated under the Police Reform Act 2002.

Sweeting J, in the King’s Bench Division, struck out most of the claims, confined the surviving claim against Cambridgeshire to an alleged falsification by one officer, ordered preliminary issues and refused summary judgment. On appeal, the central remaining questions were whether summary judgment should be granted, whether the first three defendants’ defence should be struck out, and how the litigation should proceed.

1. Disposition. The first three defendants withdrew their appeal. By consent, the claimant’s appeal was allowed in part so that the claims against all defendants were reinstated, all issues could proceed to trial rather than only the preliminary issues, and the costs order was reversed. The IOPC agreed to reinstatement of the claim against it.
2. Summary judgment. Summary judgment was refused. The material disclosed several triable issues: whether the claimant could rely on section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980; whether the defendants’ failure to obtain witness evidence was motivated by deliberate falsification and concealment, amounting to untargeted malice; and whether any proved misfeasance caused the claimant’s mental health problems. The claimant’s points concerning delay and the possibility of a fair trial were strong, but the court lacked evidence about the relevant officers’ responses, the reasons for the investigative failures and the available police documentation. It was therefore impossible to conclude that a fair trial could not take place.
3. Defence. The three Constabularies’ defence was exiguous but not improper. It should not be struck out. Disclosure was likely to clarify the issues, and the pleadings could be amended before trial. The IOPC was required to serve a defence.
4. Legal framework. The court treated misfeasance in public office as requiring public power or duty, malice and damage. Malice may be targeted or untargeted, as explained in Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of The Bank of England [2003] 2 AC 1. The Court of Appeal did not determine the merits of those allegations.
5. Case management. Although an appellate court should not ordinarily manage first-instance litigation, the existing delay made urgent progress necessary. The matter was ordered before a High Court judge for detailed and expedited directions within 28 days, with an expressed wish that the trial take place, if possible, before the end of 2026.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — [2026] EWCA Civ 391. The claimant’s appeal was allowed in part by consent and otherwise dismissed. The first three defendants’ appeal was withdrawn. Expedited directions were ordered.
2. King’s Bench Division — Sweeting J, [2025] EWHC 195 (KB). Most claims were struck out, the surviving claim was confined, preliminary issues were ordered, summary judgment was refused and costs were awarded against the claimant.