Dentons UK and Middle East LLP v Solicitors Regulation Authority Ltd

In disciplinary proceedings under the SRA’s regulatory scheme, a breach of a legal or regulatory obligation does not automatically breach Principle 7 or Outcome 7.5. The conduct must be sufficiently serious to be categorised as professional misconduct. There is no fixed formula requiring separate proof of seriousness, culpability and reprehensibility. The assessment is one of fact and degree and depends on the principle engaged and the circumstances. The question is whether competent and reputable solicitors would regard the conduct as sufficiently serious for professional censure. The Court of Appeal rejected the purely grammatical interpretation of Principle 7, having regard to the common law, the SRA’s procedural rules and the proportionality requirement in the Legal Services Act 2007. The matter was remitted on preserved factual findings for reconsideration of Principle 7 and Outcome 7.5; the remittal concerning Principles 6 and 8 was set aside.

The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal found that the Firm had breached regulation 14 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 by failing adequately to establish Client A’s source of wealth. It dismissed alleged breaches of Principles 6, 7 and 8 and Outcome 7.5, treating seriousness, culpability and reprehensibility as required. The High Court, in [2025] EWHC 535 (Admin), allowed the SRA’s appeal, held that no further seriousness requirement applied to Principle 7 or Outcome 7.5, quashed the decision in full and remitted the case. The Court of Appeal considered whether a legal breach automatically engages those provisions, the proper threshold, the extent of remittal, and costs.

The appeal was allowed in part. The Court of Appeal upheld the quashing of the dismissal of the allegations under Principle 7 and Outcome 7.5, but on a different basis from the High Court. It set aside the remittal concerning Principles 6 and 8.

1. The court agreed with Leigh Day that there is no fixed standard of seriousness or culpability for all breaches of the SRA Principles. The assessment is one of fact and degree, depending on the particular principle and the circumstances. Principles such as integrity and public trust inherently involve seriousness. The court also relied on the common-law approach in In re a Solicitor and the reasoning in Walker v Bar Standards Board, recognising the stigma attached to professional misconduct findings.
2. The grammatical interpretation of Principle 7 was rejected. Reading it as covering every breach of any legal or regulatory obligation, however minor, would substantially depart from the common law and conflict with the SRA’s procedural rules and the proportionality requirement in section 28(3)(a) of the Legal Services Act 2007.
3. Beckwith did not establish that seriousness was irrelevant. It rejected only a free-standing preliminary requirement that the tribunal first decide whether conduct amounted to professional misconduct before applying the Handbook. The correct approach is to assess seriousness as part of deciding whether the relevant principle or mandatory outcome has been breached. The formula of conduct being serious, culpable and reprehensible, derived from Sharp, is not a formula imposing three cumulative requirements.
4. A breach of Principle 7 or Outcome 7.5 can therefore be upheld only where the underlying breach of legal or regulatory obligations is sufficiently serious. The question is whether competent and reputable solicitors would regard it as serious enough to be categorised as professional misconduct.
5. The findings of fact made by the first Tribunal up to paragraph 9.377 were preserved. The new Tribunal must decide, on those findings and applying the correct seriousness test, whether Principle 7 and Outcome 7.5 were breached and, if so, what sanction should be imposed. There was no inevitable conclusion that no sanction could follow.
6. The allegations under Principles 6 and 8 were outside the scope of the SRA’s High Court appeal and should not have been remitted. Costs before the Tribunal, in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal were left for further written submissions or agreement.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — In [2026] EWCA Civ 508, allowed the appeal in part, retained the remittal of the Principle 7 and Outcome 7.5 allegations on preserved factual findings, and set aside the remittal concerning Principles 6 and 8.
2. High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court — In [2025] EWHC 535 (Admin), allowed the SRA’s appeal from the Tribunal, quashed the Tribunal’s decision in its entirety and remitted the case to a freshly constituted panel.
3. Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal — On 11 March 2024, found a breach of regulation 14 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, dismissed the alleged breaches of Principles 6, 7 and 8 and Outcome 7.5, and refused the SRA’s application for costs.