Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Martin Groom

For worker status under the Employment Rights Act 1996, the question is whether the individual works under a contract personally to perform services for another, not simply how the parties label their relationship.

A person need not be obliged to accept work, work minimum hours, or be engaged under an umbrella contract. Worker status may arise during paid work where the arrangement creates mutual obligations, including an obligation to perform work in accordance with reasonable instructions and an entitlement to remuneration. Genuine volunteering involving no payment beyond expenses and no reciprocal legal obligations is materially different.

Martin Groom was a volunteer Coastguard Rescue Officer whose position was terminated. He claimed the right under section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999 to be accompanied at an appeal meeting. The issue was whether he was a worker under section 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

The Employment Tribunal found that no contract existed. The Employment Appeal Tribunal set aside that decision and substituted a finding that Mr Groom was a worker: [2024] UKEAT 71. The MCA appealed, arguing that the voluntary relationship involved no mutual contractual obligations, particularly because a CRO was not obliged to attend any particular call-out.

The appeal was dismissed unanimously. A Coastguard Rescue Officer who attended an activity for which the governing documents entitled the officer to claim remuneration worked under a contract satisfying section 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The court left open the officer’s status when attending unpaid activities and did not decide whether an umbrella contract existed between call-outs.

1. Statutory approach. Worker status is a question of statutory interpretation. The relevant inquiry is whether there is a contract under which the individual undertakes personally to perform work or services for another who is not a client or customer. Because the facts and documents were agreed and the appeal was a test case, little deference was required to the Employment Tribunal’s evaluative conclusion.
2. Contract and mutuality. The documents showed that a CRO was free to decline a particular call-out and could limit the time spent on MCA activities. Once the CRO attended remunerated work, however, the CRO was bound to obey reasonable instructions and the MCA was bound to pay on a proper claim. That was a wage/work bargain and demonstrated an intention to create legal relations. Payments for time and disruption were remuneration, not merely reimbursement of expenses.
3. Continuing obligations. The absence of an umbrella contract, or of an obligation to work at particular times or for minimum hours, did not prevent worker status during the period of work. The ability to cancel or withdraw did not eliminate mutual obligations while the contract subsisted. It was unnecessary to decide whether a CRO could leave an emergency rescue part-way through; if necessary, that proposition would be inconsistent with the safety-critical nature of the work and the obligation to comply with reasonable requests.
4. Volunteering. The label volunteer was not conclusive. Grayson was materially different because the volunteers received no payment beyond travel expenses and had no reciprocal legal obligations. Volunteers have different legal statuses, and the decisive issue was the substance of the particular arrangement (paras [36]-[45], [49]-[64]).

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The MCA’s appeal was dismissed. [2026] EWCA Civ 6
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: The ET’s order was set aside and a finding substituted that Mr Groom was a worker. [2024] UKEAT 71
• Employment Tribunal: The claim was dismissed on the basis that Mr Groom was not a worker.