Luton and District Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Transport

An application to extend time for appealing is governed by the three-stage relief-from-sanctions approach. The court assesses the seriousness and significance of default against the particular time limit and statutory scheme. In challenges concerning nationally significant infrastructure projects, the policy of swift resolution and procedural target dates give compliance substantial weight. Delay and uncertainty may prejudice orderly development and the public interest even without direct construction delay. Public importance is a factor at the final stage, not an independent compelling reason. The merits usually receive little weight unless the proposed grounds are obviously very strong or very weak. A missed deadline or specialist legal team’s ignorance is not a good reason. Extension refused; permission to appeal refused.

The Secretary of State made a Development Consent Order under the Planning Act 2008 permitting the expansion of Luton Airport. Lang J dismissed the judicial review challenge and refused permission to appeal on 8 December 2025 ([2025] EWHC 3206 (Admin)).

Under Civil Procedure Rules 1998 Practice Direction 52D, the appellant’s notice had to be filed within seven days. Time expired on 15 December 2025. The notice was filed on 24 December, and the extension application was made on 22 January 2026. The central issue was whether time should be extended, applying the relief-from-sanctions principles and considering the NSIP timetable, public interest, prejudice, and the merits.

The Court of Appeal refused the extension of time and consequently refused permission to appeal.

1. Applicable approach. The court applied the approach in R (Hysaj) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1633, namely the same three-stage principles governing relief from sanctions under Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906: seriousness and significance of the breach; the reason for default; and all the circumstances, including efficient and proportionate litigation and compliance with rules and directions.
2. Default. The breach was serious and significant because the notice was filed nine days late against a seven-day limit, and the extension application was made nearly six weeks after expiry. The particular statutory and procedural context had to be taken into account. Overlooking a deadline or being unaware of it, even through a specialist legal team, was not a good reason. The first two stages therefore did not favour relief.
3. NSIP policy and prejudice. The accelerated regime for nationally significant infrastructure projects was designed to prevent legal challenges causing delay. Finality, orderly administration, and compliance with the timetable in Practice Direction 52D carried particular weight. The delay caused uncertainty and affected the orderly progress of the development, even though it did not yet postpone physical construction. It also caused the Court of Appeal to miss its own target dates and imposed additional costs on the respondents.
4. Public interest and merits. Public importance was a factor at the final stage, but it was not an independent compelling reason for extending time. The merits should ordinarily receive little attention unless the grounds were obviously very strong or very weak. The grounds here were not sufficiently clear, and the lower judgment disclosed no obvious flaw.
5. Order. The application for an extension of time was refused. Permission to appeal was therefore refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division). Refused the application for an extension of time and consequently refused permission to appeal: [2026] EWCA Civ 648.
• High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Planning Court. Lang J dismissed the judicial review challenge to the Development Consent Order and refused permission to appeal: [2025] EWHC 3206 (Admin).