R (A Child: Leave to Oppose Adoption), Re

Applications for leave to oppose adoption involve two stages. First, the court asks whether there has been a relevant change of circumstances sufficient to open the door to leave. The change need not be significant, unexpected or unforeseen. Secondly, the court conducts a broad welfare evaluation, including the parent’s prospects of successfully resisting adoption and the impact on the child. Where the first-stage application is refused and a second-stage failure is clear, the court should state that alternative conclusion briefly. An adoption order should not be made on the same occasion as refusal of leave. That procedural irregularity does not require the order to be set aside where the refusal was correct and the appeal process caused no substantive injustice.

A birth mother sought leave to oppose adoption of her daughter, who had lived with foster carers since birth. The Family Court at Telford refused leave under section 47 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and made an adoption order on the same day. The mother challenged the decision, alleging misdirection as to the change-of-circumstances threshold, failure to separate the two stages, inadequate welfare and risk analysis, and procedural unfairness. The central issues were whether the refusal of leave was wrong or unjust and whether the same-day adoption order required appellate intervention.

The Court of Appeal, in a judgment given by Peter Jackson LJ and agreed by Baker and Dove LJJ, refused permission to appeal. The refusal of leave to oppose was the right order, and the adoption order remained in force.

1. First stage. Section 47(7) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 requires a change of circumstances since the placement order. The judge’s repeated references to significant change were inapt, because the statute contains no such requirement. However, the judgment and transcript read as a whole showed that he applied, or at least did not materially depart from, the correct test. He found that the mother’s work had produced no real change in her thinking or understanding and concluded that there was insufficient change.
2. Insight and change. Insight and change should not generally be equated. Here, however, the application relied on a single asserted change in insight and understanding. The evidence was principally self-report, the work undertaken was limited, and no comparable change was asserted for the father. The judge was entitled to compare the mother’s position with that recorded during the earlier proceedings.
3. Second stage. The two stages were not impermissibly elided. The court was not required at the threshold stage to conduct a full welfare assessment or order further parental assessment. The established mistreatment of three older children made the risk to the fourth child apparent. The judge should nevertheless have stated, as an alternative basis where appropriate, that the application would fail on welfare grounds. The prospects of successfully resisting adoption lacked solidity and there was no possible welfare benefit in allowing entrenched opposition to continue.
4. Procedural irregularity. Making the adoption order on the same day as refusing leave was contrary to the Practice Guidance (Adoption: Final Hearings) [2018] 1 WLR 2232 and was procedurally irregular. The guidance should ordinarily be followed. Nevertheless, because leave had been correctly refused and the mother had a full opportunity to present her case on appeal, the irregularity caused no substantive injustice. Permission was therefore refused and the adoption order stood.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) refused permission to appeal and held that the adoption order made on 13 January 2026 remained in force: [2026] EWCA Civ 673.
• Family Court at Telford HHJ Lopez refused the birth mother’s application for leave to oppose adoption and made the adoption order on the same day.