CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited & Ors v The Republic of India

Ratification of the New York Convention does not, without more, waive a state's adjudicative immunity. Article III must be interpreted as a whole. Its reference to the procedural rules of the territory where enforcement is sought includes state immunity where that is a procedural rule in the forum. The opening obligation to recognise and enforce awards is therefore qualified by the forum's procedural law. The reasoning concerning the different ICSID Convention scheme cannot simply be transferred to Article III. A treaty waiver under the State Immunity Act 1978 requires clear and unequivocal consent to jurisdiction, although express words such as waiver or submission are unnecessary.

The claimants sought recognition and enforcement in England of two investment arbitration awards against India. The awards arose from arbitration under the Mauritius–India bilateral investment treaty. The High Court directed a preliminary issue concerning whether India's ratification of the New York Convention constituted a prior written submission to the jurisdiction under section 2(2) of the State Immunity Act 1978. Sir William Blair held that it did not: [2025] EWHC 964 (Comm). The claimants appealed. The central issue was whether Article III's obligation to recognise and enforce awards displaced state immunity or instead preserved the procedural law of the enforcing territory.

Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the High Court's answer to the preliminary issue. The respondent's additional arguments concerning the commercial reservation and section 9 of the State Immunity Act 1978 therefore did not require determination.

1. Applicable test. Under section 2(2), treaty wording amounts to a submission to jurisdiction if, properly construed under public international law, it necessarily expresses clear and unequivocal consent. Express words such as waiver or submission are unnecessary. Treaty interpretation follows Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a holistic exercise directed to ordinary meaning, context, object and purpose.
2. Procedural character of immunity. State immunity is a procedural jurisdictional bar. It prevents determination of the merits but does not extinguish the underlying substantive right. The phrase “rules of procedure” in Article III therefore ordinarily encompasses state immunity in the territory where enforcement is sought.
3. Construction of Article III. The words requiring recognition and enforcement cannot be isolated from the subsequent qualification requiring compliance with the forum's procedural rules. Article III consequently preserves state immunity on its own terms. That interpretation is neither ambiguous nor unreasonable, and the travaux préparatoires merely confirm it.
4. ICSID comparison. The decision in Infrastructure Services Luxembourg SARL v The Kingdom of Spain [2026] UKSC 9 concerned the materially different, self-contained ICSID regime. Its reasoning on Article 54(1), including the express preservation of execution immunity, could not simply be read across to Article III. The High Court of Australia's decision on the same issue was highly persuasive and reached the same conclusion.

Lewison LJ added that comparative authorities which had not addressed the significance of “rules of procedure” had reduced persuasive value. He also made an obiter observation that appeal bundles should contain only authorities necessary to resolve the issues.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division). The appeal was dismissed unanimously on 24 June 2026: [2026] EWCA Civ 797.
• High Court of Justice, Commercial Court. Sir William Blair determined the preliminary issue against the claimants, holding that ratification of the New York Convention did not amount to a submission to jurisdiction: [2025] EWHC 964 (Comm).