A1 v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In an appeal concerning revocation of refugee status, statutory presumptions that a person convicted of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the community must be assessed by reference to all material evidence. The decision-maker must address whether the person continues to pose the relevant danger, including whether past extremist support has ended. Evidence relevant to the seriousness of the offence may also bear on continuing dangerousness. A finding of low risk of reoffending does not necessarily rebut the presumption. Where a tribunal fails to address a central factual issue material to rebuttal of the presumption, that is an error of law and remittal may be required.

The Secretary of State appealed against the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)’s decision of 17 March 2025, which had dismissed her appeal against the First-tier Tribunal’s decision of 9 July 2024. The First-tier Tribunal had allowed A1’s appeal against revocation of his refugee status under section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

A1 had been convicted of terrorist-publication offences and sentenced to concurrent terms of two years’ imprisonment. The First-tier Tribunal found that he had not rebutted the presumption concerning a particularly serious crime but had rebutted the separate presumption that he was a danger to the community. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether that assessment contained a material error of law.

Appeal allowed and case remitted. Singh LJ gave the judgment of the court; Lewis LJ and Edis LJ agreed.

1. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal lay only on a point of law. Appellate courts and tribunals should respect the specialist fact-finding function of the First-tier Tribunal. Disagreement with factual evaluation, or the omission of an express reference to every item of evidence, does not by itself establish an error of law.
2. The First-tier Tribunal’s findings on the two section 72 presumptions were logically inconsistent. It had found that A1’s offences were intentional, that he had a mindset supportive of Islamic State, and that he had not acknowledged the intentionality of his acts or his support for Daesh. When considering the second presumption, it did not determine whether he still supported Daesh or explain why that past support no longer indicated a danger to the community.
3. The issue was not confined to whether A1 personally intended terrorism in the United Kingdom. Material posted online could inspire others to commit terrorism, even if the publisher did not intend that consequence. The tribunal therefore had to assess whether subsequent evidence and protective factors had sufficiently addressed the concerns arising from the offending.
4. The assessment of dangerousness is fact-sensitive. In terrorism cases, the seriousness of potential harm may mean that a relatively low risk of further serious offending is sufficient for the presumption to remain unrebutted. But KD v Secretary of State for the Home Department was of limited assistance because its conclusion depended on its own facts and involved a perversity challenge, which was absent here.
5. The First-tier Tribunal had failed to determine crucial facts material to the statutory burden resting on A1. The proper remedy was remittal to that tribunal for redetermination in accordance with the judgments of the Court of Appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal from the Upper Tribunal allowed; the case was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for redetermination.
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): on 17 March 2025, dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal against the First-tier Tribunal’s determination.
• First-tier Tribunal: on 9 July 2024, allowed A1’s appeal against revocation of refugee status under section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.