Paul Ward v Gagandeep Rai

Appellate interference with a discretionary case management decision requires legal misdirection, failure to consider relevant matters, consideration of irrelevant matters, or a decision outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement. Strong disagreement with the decision is insufficient. An ex tempore judgment must be read as a whole and in its procedural context.

Points of dispute in detailed assessment must identify precisely what is disputed and why. Non-compliance and late variations engage a discretion exercised under the overriding objective. Strike-out or exclusion may be justified, but an adjournment and costs sanctions may also be permissible. The consequences of default should distinguish additional prejudice and expense from hearing time that timely compliance would itself have required. Parties cannot assume that late compliance will receive lenient treatment.

Paul Ward, the claimant, brought a personal injury claim against Gagandeep Rai, the defendant, following a road traffic accident. The claim settled by acceptance of a Part 36 offer. In subsequent detailed assessment proceedings, the defendant challenged the claimant’s charges for work on documents. His points of dispute contained general objections and referred to an annotated schedule which was supplied only shortly before the assessment hearing.

Deputy Costs Judge Friston refused the claimant’s request to strike out the relevant point of dispute. He permitted reliance on the late schedule, adjourned the assessment and subsequently imposed a costs sanction. On the claimant’s appeal, Hill J, [2025] EWHC 1681 (KB), set aside the assessment order, struck out the disputed point and refused reliance on the schedule. She remitted consequential issues to the Costs Judge.

The defendant brought a second appeal. The central question was whether the Costs Judge’s decisions fell outside his permissible discretion, thereby justifying appellate intervention.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. The Costs Judge’s decision was restored. He had made no error of principle, omitted no relevant consideration and reached a decision within the generous ambit of his discretion. The High Court had exceeded the limits of appellate review by substituting its assessment of the appropriate course ([34]–[36], [59]–[63]).

2. The governing question was whether the case management decision could properly have been made, rather than whether the appellate court would have decided differently. The principles stated in Broughton v Kop Football (Cayman) Ltd and adopted in Global Torch Ltd v Apex Global Management Ltd (No 2) applied. Questions of weight were primarily for the first instance judge. An appellate court must account for its different perspective, the pressures attending case management and the circumstances of an ex tempore judgment, which should be read as a whole ([34]–[40], [59]).

3. The requirements explained in Ainsworth v Stewarts Law LLP applied to the inter partes assessment. Points of dispute must identify the specific disputes and their grounds. The Costs Judge had proceeded on the basis that the disputed point was non-compliant and had considered its deficiencies, the extreme lateness of the schedule and the explanation for delay. Settlement discussions were not a good excuse, although the absence of a tactical attempt to wrongfoot the claimant was relevant ([47]–[51]).

4. The stricter approach to procedural compliance following the 2013 reforms applied. Judges need not expressly rehearse each aspect of the overriding objective when making case management decisions. The discretion under paragraph 13.10 of Practice Direction 47 remained wide. Celtic Bioenergy Ltd v Knowles Ltd established no obligation to reject a late variation merely because rejection would have been permissible. Strike-out and exclusion were available, but permitting reliance with an adjournment and costs sanctions was also within the Costs Judge’s discretion ([52]–[54], [57]–[58]).

5. A third hearing day would have been necessary even with timely service of the schedule. The relevant consequences of default were therefore the additional preparation difficulties, inconvenience and costs of splitting the hearing. Possible prejudice concerning settlement offers also required consideration. The claimant could have chased the missing schedule or sought protection through the terms of an offer. The limited sanction ultimately imposed was not itself under appeal ([55]–[58]).

6. Advocates should raise material omissions or ambiguities in reasons with the judge. Clarification and, where appropriate, reconsideration should precede resort to an appeal. The decision conferred no entitlement to leniency: non-compliant points and late variations remain liable to strike-out, exclusion or conditions, including costs sanctions ([41]–[43], [49], [61]).

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2026] EWCA Civ 816 . Allowed the defendant’s second appeal and restored the Costs Judge’s decision.
• High Court, King’s Bench Division: Hill J, [2025] EWHC 1681 (KB) . Allowed the claimant’s appeal, set aside the assessment order, struck out Point 23 and refused reliance on the annotated schedule. Consequential issues, including proportionality, were remitted to the Costs Judge.
• Detailed assessment: Deputy Costs Judge Friston refused strike-out and permitted reliance on the late schedule on 6 August 2024. Following an adjourned hearing on 8 November 2024, he assessed the bill and imposed a costs sanction for time wasted dealing with the schedule.