City Outdoor Media Limited v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Anor

A discontinuance notice under regulation 8 of the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007 is valid where the authority is satisfied that it is necessary to remedy substantial injury to amenity or danger to the public. The same test applies whether the notice concerns a particular advertisement or the use of a site. For a site-use notice, the decision-maker need not assess every hypothetical advertisement or deemed-consent class. The inquiry is shaped by the case and evidence presented. Withdrawal of deemed consent does not determine a later application for express consent. The distinction between the two statutory powers remains material.

The appellant operated a large digital advertisement display on land in Manchester. Express consent had previously been granted, followed by deemed consent. Manchester City Council served a discontinuance notice under regulation 8(1)(b) of the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007, directed to the use of the site for advertisements enjoying deemed consent. An inspector dismissed the appeal against the notice.

The appellant’s statutory review claim under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 was dismissed by HHJ Pearce, with permission to appeal granted. The appeal concerned whether the inspector had to assess the effect of removing all deemed-consent rights and whether Putney Bridge Approach Limited v SSCLG ([2018] EWCA Civ 2268) required reconsideration.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice Dove gave the judgment, with Sir Nicholas Underhill and Lord Justice Newey agreeing. The inspector had identified and applied the correct statutory test and reached a reasoned planning judgment based on the evidence about the site and existing display.
2. Regulation 8(1) requires the local planning authority, or an inspector redetermining the merits on appeal, to be satisfied that issuing the notice is necessary to remedy substantial injury to the amenity of the locality or a danger to members of the public. That test is the same under regulation 8(1)(a) and regulation 8(1)(b).
3. Regulation 8(1)(b) does not expressly or impliedly require an assessment of every possible form of deemed consent, every hypothetical advertisement, or the wider impact of withdrawing all deemed-consent rights. Such an assessment would impose an unworkable burden and would add an unwarranted gloss to the statutory language. Where an appellant wishes to rely on an alternative class or form of advertisement, it must provide material and submissions sufficient to substantiate that case. This does not reverse the burden of proof.
4. A discontinuance notice affects deemed consent only. It does not prevent an application for express consent. The notice may be a material consideration, but it is not dispositive of the merits of a later application, which must be assessed under the applicable statutory test. The distinction between a notice concerning a particular advertisement and one concerning use of a site therefore remains significant, with the latter potentially raising a wider inquiry.
5. The conclusions were independently supported by, and were consistent with, Putney Bridge Approach Limited v SSCLG ([2018] EWCA Civ 2268; [2019] PTSR 1431). There was no basis for overturning that decision under the principles in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited ([1944] KB 718; [1944] 2 All ER 293).

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — dismissed the appeal against the order of HHJ Pearce.
• High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Planning Court — dismissed the statutory review claim on 18 July 2025 and granted permission to appeal: [2025] EWHC 1847 (Admin).