LMN & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

The exceptions to the former two-child limit on universal credit were objectively justified. Disregarding adopted children and children in non-parental caring arrangements avoided discouraging care which would otherwise fall to the state. That justification did not require an equivalent disregard for children conceived non-consensually. The non-consensual conception exception could lawfully depend on the circumstances of conception of the third or subsequent child. Earlier non-consensual conceptions did not require an exception for a later consensually conceived child. Those distinctions were justified even on the assumption that very weighty reasons were required.

An appellate court may assess proportionality afresh where a challenge to secondary legislation raises a general legal issue with wide significance and substantial public importance.

LMN and EFG were universal credit claimants who had experienced severe domestic and sexual abuse. Their households included children conceived non-consensually. Under the former two-child limit, the child element was ordinarily payable for the two oldest children living in a claimant’s household. The non-consensual conception exception applied to a third or subsequent child, while adopted children and children in non-parental caring arrangements were disregarded when determining the order of children.

EFG’s two older children had been conceived non-consensually. She received no child element for two later, consensually conceived children. LMN’s older child returned from local authority care, changing the order of the children in her household. Her youngest child attracted the non-consensual conception exception only after she disclosed the circumstances of conception. Neither claimant challenged the individual benefit decisions in these proceedings.

The claimants brought judicial review proceedings against the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, challenging the regulations governing the exceptions. Collins Rice J dismissed their claims in [2025] EWHC 1849 (Admin). Their appeals concerned discrimination under article 14, read with article 8 or article 1 of the First Protocol, and alleged errors in the judge’s proportionality assessment. The central issue was whether the different treatment produced by the exceptions was objectively justified.

Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lewis LJ gave the substantive judgment, with which Andrews LJ and the President of the Family Division agreed.

1. The Court of Appeal should assess proportionality afresh. Applying Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] UKSC 30, the challenge concerned secondary legislation and a general legal rule affecting many cases. The specific issue had not previously been considered by the court and had wide significance. Its consequences for women who had experienced extreme domestic and sexual abuse also gave it substantial public importance (paras 32–35).

2. The complaint fell within article 8 and probably within article 1 of the First Protocol for adult benefit claimants. Being the mother of non-consensually conceived children constituted a status. There were doubts about whether the comparator groups were relevantly similar. Adoptive parents and non-parental carers assumed responsibility for another person’s child, whereas biological mothers already had parental rights and responsibilities. The circumstances of conception of an additional child also differed. The court nevertheless assumed the necessary comparability and decided justification (paras 39–41).

3. The exception for adoption and non-parental caring arrangements pursued the legitimate aim of avoiding a welfare disincentive to assuming responsibility for children who might otherwise require state care. It was rationally connected to that aim, and no less intrusive measure was available. Its exclusion from the ordering rules was proportionate and consistent with the fiscal aims recognised in R (SC) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2021] UKSC 26. Those reasons did not require extension of the exception to biological mothers who later had consensually conceived children (paras 42–47).

4. The non-consensual conception exception permissibly recognised the absence of choice or control over conception of an additional child. The relevant circumstances were those at the conception and birth of that child. Extending the exception to a later consensually conceived child because earlier children had been conceived non-consensually would conflict with the underlying limit. Both distinctions were justified by very weighty reasons. Social and economic policy required appropriate respect for executive choices, while sex discrimination required cogent justification. Whether the particular distinctions actually had a disproportionate adverse impact on women remained unresolved (paras 46–51).

5. The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was unincorporated and created no directly enforceable domestic rights. Its relevance to interpreting the Convention or resolving this dispute had not been demonstrated (para 52).

6. The fresh assessment rendered any alleged errors below immaterial. In any event, the judge had assessed proportionality. Her discussion of socioeconomic fairness and parental responsibility was permissible when her judgment was read as a whole. The relevant regulations and their operation were compatible with article 14, read with article 8 and, if applicable, article 1 of the First Protocol (paras 53–59).

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2026] EWCA Civ 846 . Dismissed the appeal after assessing proportionality afresh. Upheld the dismissal of the discrimination claims.
• High Court, King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Collins Rice J, [2025] EWHC 1849 (Admin) . Heard the judicial review claims together and dismissed them. The appeal concerned the article 14 ground and alleged errors in the justification assessment.