HB (Appointment of Personal Welfare Deputy), Re

A personal welfare deputyship requires a fact-specific assessment of P’s best interests under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Section 16(4) does not create an exceptional threshold. Its preference for a court decision, and for limited powers, must be weighed with all best-interests considerations.

A deputyship may be appropriate in the middle ground between routine collaborative decisions and decisions reserved for the court. Relevant features may include a close applicant able to understand P’s wishes, a foreseeable stream of linked decisions, transition into adult services, deficient statutory consultation, and a need for prompt decisions. Autonomy is not a free-standing determinative test. The court should instead apply the statutory principles, the least-restrictive option, P’s participation, wishes and feelings, dignity and quality of life.

HB, a 22-year-old man with profound learning disabilities, autism and complex health and care needs, lacked capacity to make many personal-welfare decisions. His parents applied jointly and severally to be his personal welfare deputies. They sought authority over defined welfare matters, including residence, care, treatment and complaints.

A Tier 2 Court of Protection judge refused the unopposed application, holding that collaborative decision-making had worked and that deputyship would unnecessarily impair HB’s autonomy. The judge’s decision is reported at [2026] EWCOP 12 (T2).

The parents appealed. The central issue was when the court should appoint a personal welfare deputy under section 16 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, particularly for a young adult facing transitions in care and a foreseeable series of important decisions.

1. Appeal allowed. The judge’s finding that collaborative decision-making had worked in HB’s best interests was not open on the unchallenged evidence. The parents had repeatedly had to overcome failures by public bodies to secure suitable education, placement and care. That erroneous finding materially underpinned the refusal.

2. The appointment question is governed by the fact-specific best-interests framework in sections 1, 4 and 16 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Section 16(4) requires the court to weigh its preference for a court decision and for limited deputy powers. It does not impose an artificial or exceptional barrier to a welfare deputyship.

3. The court identified a middle ground between routine decisions, for which sections 4 and 5 support collaborative decision-making, and grave decisions which the court itself should determine. A deputyship may properly occupy that middle ground. Relevant, non-exhaustive features include the applicant’s special relationship with P; enhancement of P’s wishes and feelings; a foreseeable stream of decisions; transition from children’s to adult services; failures in statutory consultation; and the need for prompt, agile decisions.

4. Autonomy was not a useful free-standing determinant. The statutory inquiry instead requires the least restrictive option, participation by P, and proper weight for P’s wishes and feelings. On these facts, appointing parents uniquely able to understand HB’s communication was likely to enhance his effective participation and quality of life.

5. The application was not a binary choice. Section 16 permitted a defined and limited appointment. The parents should be appointed in principle, jointly and severally, but the application was remitted to a Tier 2 Court of Protection judge to determine the precise scope and duration of the order.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the parents’ appeal in [2026] EWCA Civ 960 . The court held that a personal welfare deputyship should be made in principle and remitted scope and duration to the Court of Protection.
• Court of Protection: HHJ Beckley refused the parents’ application to become personal welfare deputies in [2026] EWCOP 12 (T2).