Paul Morgan Evans & Anor v Swansea Building Society

Where permission to appeal is refused on paper, Civil Procedure Rules 1998 r 52.4(2) gives the applicant a right to request oral reconsideration unless the judge has made an order under r 52.4(3) barring that step. The request need not be made by a formal application notice and may be made by email.

An appellate court may itself determine the reconsideration rather than remit it where that best serves the overriding objective. Interim relief should be refused where there is no serious issue to be tried and the balance of convenience, including the absence of a meaningful cross-undertaking and prejudice to a secured creditor, strongly favours refusal.

The appellants challenged Ritchie J’s order of 24 February 2026 striking out, as totally without merit, their emailed request for an oral reconsideration of his earlier refusal of permission to appeal. The underlying litigation concerned possession of a residential property secured by the respondent’s mortgage.

During this appeal, the appellants also sought to adduce fresh evidence, add a ground challenging the execution and validity of the legal charge, and restrain the respondent from selling the property. The respondent accepted that the emailed request should not have been struck out merely because it was not a formal application, but submitted that any oral reconsideration would fail on its merits.

The central questions were whether the appellants had a right to request oral reconsideration and whether the Court of Appeal should determine that reconsideration and the associated applications itself.

1. The appeal was allowed on a narrow basis. Ritchie J had not made an order under Civil Procedure Rules 1998 r 52.4(3) when refusing permission on 20 February 2026. The appellants therefore retained the right under r 52.4(2) to request reconsideration at an oral hearing. Their request could be made by email and did not require an application notice.

2. The court did not decide whether the limited civil restraint orders required permission for that request. The parties had not argued that issue, and it was unnecessary to resolve the appeal.

3. The court exercised the High Court’s powers and determined the requested reconsideration itself rather than remitting it. That course best served the overriding objective because the appellants had ample opportunity to address the issues.

4. The application for permission to appeal against HHJ Kember’s order remained entirely without merit. The essential procedural requirements concerning an appeal bundle and service had not been met. The proposed fresh evidence and amended ground introduced a challenge to the validity of the charge which was outside the appeal pursued before Ritchie J and, in any event, had no material merit. Even if the legal mortgage had been defective as a deed, the signed 2020 mortgage documentation and advance of funds were capable of creating an equitable mortgage supporting possession.

5. The applications to adduce fresh evidence and amend the grounds were dismissed. The application for an injunction restraining sale was also dismissed. There was no serious issue to be tried and the balance of convenience strongly favoured the respondent, given the appellants’ inability to provide a meaningful cross-undertaking, the continuing mortgage deficit, and the respondent’s need to realise its security.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal against Ritchie J’s order on the limited ground that the appellants could request oral reconsideration by email, but itself reconsidered and dismissed the underlying permission application and dismissed the further applications: [2026] EWCA Civ 978 .

• High Court: Ritchie J struck out the appellants’ emailed request for oral reconsideration on 24 February 2026, having earlier refused permission to appeal on paper.

• County Court: HHJ Kember refused the appellants’ applications on 16 December 2025 and made limited civil restraint orders. The appellants sought permission to appeal that order.