FD, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Section 22(3) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 permits an authority-to-carry scheme to specify a class of persons whenever that is necessary in the public interest. The statutory language is not confined to persons who pose a terrorism-related threat. The Act’s text, structure and legislative context show that authority-to-carry powers have a wider border-control function.

The Secretary of State may therefore include persons subject to deportation orders among those for whom authority to carry may be refused. Section 22(7) preserves immigration status; it does not restrict the scope of the power or make a refusal practically insignificant.

FD, a Jamaican national and long-term United Kingdom resident, was subject to a deportation order. After being told that he had indefinite leave to remain and receiving an eVisa showing settled status, he travelled to Turkey. The Secretary of State refused authority for his airline to carry him back to the United Kingdom under paragraph 14(f) of the Authority to Carry Scheme 2023.

Constable J allowed the relevant ground of FD’s judicial review claim. The judge held that the Scheme could apply only to persons posing a terrorism-related threat: [2025] EWHC 3291 (Admin). The Secretary of State appealed. Although FD had returned to the United Kingdom, the Court exercised its discretion to decide the important and recurring public-law issue concerning the meaning of section 22(3).

1. Appeal allowed on ground 1. Lord Justice Lewis, with whom Sir Nicholas Underhill and Lord Justice Peter Jackson agreed, set aside the part of the order which held the Scheme inapplicable to FD. The question was suitable for determination despite its practical academic character between the parties. It concerned an important, recurring issue of statutory interpretation that might otherwise evade authoritative review.
2. Statutory interpretation begins with Parliament’s chosen words, read in their immediate and wider statutory context and in light of statutory purpose. Section 22(3) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 permits specification of a class only where necessary in the public interest. Its ordinary language does not restrict that public interest to countering terrorism-related activity.
3. The statutory context confirmed that construction. Elsewhere, where Parliament intended powers to depend on terrorism-related activity, it said so expressly. The Act’s long title and structure also addressed matters beyond terrorism, including authority-to-carry arrangements and transport security. Its legislative history showed that Part 4 replaced an earlier immigration authority-to-carry regime, rather than creating a power limited to terrorism.
4. Persons subject to deportation orders could lawfully be specified under paragraph 14(f). A deportation order follows a conclusion that deportation is conducive to the public good, requires the person to leave, and makes re-entry in breach of the order a criminal offence. Those consequences entitled the Secretary of State to conclude that including such persons was necessary in the public interest. The Court expressed no view on the Scheme’s application to the other groups described in paragraph 14(f).
5. Ground 2 was dismissed. Section 22(7) merely confirms that an authority-to-carry decision does not itself determine immigration entitlement or permission to enter. It neither assists construction of section 22(3) nor realistically removes the practical effect of a continuing refusal of authority to carry.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal on the construction of section 22(3) and set aside paragraph 3(1) of the High Court’s order: [2026] EWCA Civ 999 .
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Refused permission to challenge the finding that the individual refusal was unlawful, but granted permission on the statutory-interpretation grounds considered in this appeal: [2026] EWCA Civ 320.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Allowed FD’s ground that the Authority to Carry Scheme 2023 was inapplicable because he posed no terrorism-related threat, and also found the individual refusal unlawful: [2025] EWHC 3291 (Admin) .