R v Nana Oppong

Bad-character evidence may be admitted under section 101 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 where the defendant’s evidence mounts a sufficiently serious attack on the prosecution, including allegations that evidence was manipulated or withheld. The trial judge’s direct assessment of the defendant’s presentation in the witness box attracts substantial appellate weight. Fairness requires the evidence to be limited and the jury to receive clear directions on its use. In a life-sentence case, the minimum term may reflect overall criminality, subject to totality and the avoidance of double counting. The appellate question is whether the sentence is arguably manifestly excessive.

Following a trial at Woolwich Crown Court, the applicant was convicted of murder, firearm and wounding offences, and possession of a prohibited firearm. He had also pleaded guilty to a Class A drug-supply conspiracy. The trial judge admitted evidence of a 2012 conviction for perverting the course of justice as bad-character evidence and imposed a life sentence with a minimum term of 36 years and 111 days, alongside concurrent sentences totalling 28 years.

After a single judge refused leave, the applicant renewed his applications. The conviction challenge concerned the statutory gateways and fairness of the bad-character ruling. The sentence challenge alleged that the minimum term was manifestly excessive. The court also considered an extension of time for the sentence application.

1. Disposition. The court granted an extension of time if required. It refused renewed leave to appeal against conviction, holding that the conviction was safe. It also refused leave to appeal against sentence because there was no arguable basis for contending that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
2. Bad-character evidence. The trial judge was entitled to consider the applicant’s repeated allegations that prosecution or police material had been deliberately edited or withheld to make the case appear stronger, together with the developing allegation that another person had used the blue burner phone. That was the kind of attack on the prosecution capable of bringing the evidence within gateway (g) under section 101 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. It was unnecessary to rely on more than one gateway, although the court was satisfied that the other gateways relied upon were also available.
3. Appellate assessment and fairness. The appellate court was not in as good a position as the trial judge to assess the impression created by the applicant in the witness box. The trial judge had limited the evidence to the minimum required and had given clear directions explaining its relevance and warning the jury not to convict wholly or mainly on the previous convictions. Those directions were ample to cure any prejudice under section 101(3).
4. Sentence. The trial judge properly reflected the applicant’s overall criminality, observed totality and avoided double counting the use of a firearm. The court’s task was to stand back and assess whether the uplift was arguably manifestly excessive. Significant planning and premeditation, sophisticated preparation, the use of multiple vehicles and burner phones, injuries to bystanders, the impact on innocent people, the applicant’s criminal record and related drug and firearms offending justified the sentence. The personal mitigation relied upon would not have made a substantial difference to the sentence as a whole.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2026] EWCA Crim 1051 , following refusal by a single judge, the court granted an extension of time if required and refused renewed leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
• Crown Court at Woolwich — Following a trial before Bennathan J and a jury, the applicant was convicted on 28 May 2024 and sentenced on 31 May 2024 to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 36 years and 111 days, plus concurrent sentences totalling 28 years.