R v Connor Probert

A discretionary life sentence under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is a last resort. It may nevertheless be justified for a dangerous offender where the offending is sufficiently serious and the risk of further serious harm cannot be reliably assessed or expected to reduce during a determinate or extended sentence. Youth, previous good character and limited injury remain important, but do not preclude life imprisonment in an exceptionally unusual case involving premeditation, extreme violence, lack of empathy and unexplained risk. The Court of Appeal should not interfere where the sentencing judge carefully evaluates those matters and the sentence is not manifestly excessive. Such a decision is fact-sensitive and does not establish that comparable cases ordinarily warrant life imprisonment.

In R v Connor Probert, the appellant appealed from the Crown Court at Cardiff, where he received life imprisonment with a minimum term of 4 years and 2 months for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861. Concurrent sentences were imposed for strangulation and possession of an offensive weapon. He accepted that he was dangerous and that an extended sentence was appropriate, but argued that life imprisonment was excessive given his age, previous good character, absence of convictions, relatively limited category 3 harm and the isolated nature of the episode. The central issue was whether the seriousness of the offending and the unpredictable duration of the risk justified a discretionary life sentence under section 285(3) of the Sentencing Act 2020.

The appeal was dismissed. The challenge was confined to whether the seriousness of the offending justified a discretionary life sentence; the minimum term and concurrent sentences were not challenged.

1. Statutory approach. The court accepted that the sentencing judge had followed the approach in Attorney-General’s Reference No 27 of 2013 (R v Burinskas) when applying section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Dangerousness was not challenged. The judge therefore had to decide whether the seriousness of the offence and associated offences justified life imprisonment. A life sentence is a last resort. A determinate or extended sentence may be inadequate where it could expire while a significant risk of serious harm remains and no reliable estimate can be made of when that risk will reduce.
2. Assessment of the offending and risk. The judge was entitled to find premeditation, victim vulnerability and high culpability. She accepted that there was no intention to kill, but was entitled to reject the appellant’s claim that he had voluntarily desisted. The appellant’s lack of insight and empathy, inconsistent accounts and inability or refusal to explain his conduct meant that the psychiatric evidence provided no reliable indication of when the risk of similar serious offending would diminish.
3. Mitigation and proportionality. The judge considered the appellant’s young age, good character, absence of previous convictions and category 3 harm. The exceptional rarity of a discretionary life sentence for a young first-time offender did not make it unavailable. On the extraordinary facts, and given the inadequacy of determinate and extended alternatives, the sentence was not manifestly excessive. The decision was highly fact-sensitive and should not be treated as a general indication that comparable cases warrant life imprisonment.
4. Final clarification. The statutory surcharge applicable at the time of offending was £228 under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Surcharge Order) 2012, rather than the earlier sum announced in court.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 9 July 2026, with leave of the Single Judge, the court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the applicable statutory surcharge as £228: [2026] EWCA Crim 1084 .
2. Crown Court at Cardiff: On 11 July 2025, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 4 years and 2 months for the section 18 offence, with concurrent sentences for strangulation and possession of an offensive weapon.