R v Gregor Bauld

On a sentence appeal, the question is whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. A different sentence that another judge might have imposed is not enough. Where an offender with mental disorder may receive a restricted hospital order under the Mental Health Act 1983 or life imprisonment with a hybrid order, the court must give sound reasons for departing from a penal sentence and compare the public-protection and release consequences of each regime. Psychiatrists’ preference for a hospital order is not decisive. Voluntary drug abuse which contributes to the seriousness of a mental disorder may be relevant to retained responsibility. Considering that factor in placing an offence in a high-responsibility category does not prevent a separate uplift for overall seriousness where the factors are distinct.

The applicant was tried at the Crown Court at Leicester for murdering his mother. The jury acquitted him of murder but convicted him of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. He was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Sentencing Act 2020, with a minimum term of 12 years and five months, together with a section 45 A hybrid order under the Mental Health Act 1983.

A single judge refused leave to appeal. On renewal, the applicant required an extension of 115 days, which was granted. The written grounds challenged the hybrid order, the finding of high retained responsibility, the assessment of seriousness and mitigation, and the treatment of his mental disorder. At the hearing, the challenge to the life sentence and hybrid order was withdrawn. The central issue became whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

1. The court granted the 115-day extension of time but refused the renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence.

2. The appellate court was concerned only with whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. As stated in R v Edwards [2018] EWCA Crim 595, the Court of Appeal is not a court of review. The fact that another judge might have imposed a different sentence is insufficient.

3. The court addressed the withdrawn challenge to the form of disposal because it raised matters of general interest. The authorities, including R v Vowles [2015] EWCA Crim 45, R v Calocane [2024] EWCA Crim 490 and R v Sowerby [2020] EWCA Crim 898, required sound reasons before departing from a penal sentence and careful attention to the public-protection and release consequences of each regime. A restricted hospital order under sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983 does not necessarily provide greater protection than life imprisonment with a section 45 A hybrid order. The comparison is fact-sensitive, and the fact that psychiatrists prefer a hospital order is not decisive.

4. The judge was entitled to find high retained responsibility. The voluntary abuse of drugs was relevant under the sentencing guideline because it contributed to the seriousness of the applicant’s mental disorder. A psychotic episode caused by both schizophrenia and voluntary drug abuse was not inconsistent with the jury’s finding of diminished responsibility. The previous treatment and psychotic episodes also meant that the complaint about an undiagnosed disorder could not succeed.

5. The 24-year guideline starting point, within a range of 15 to 40 years for high retained responsibility, gave the judge flexibility to reflect the seriousness of the offence. The uplift to 30 years was open to him. There was no double counting: drug abuse contributed to the category of retained responsibility, while the overall seriousness of the offence and the use of a knife justified the separate uplift. Good character and absence of previous convictions provided only limited, if any, mitigation in the circumstances.

6. The trial judge was uniquely well placed, having presided over the three-week trial, to assess seriousness, culpability, harm and mitigation. There was no arguable ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. The renewed application for leave to appeal was therefore refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2026] EWCA Crim 1119 , the court granted an extension of time but refused the renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence.
2. Single judge — Refused the applicant’s initial application for leave to appeal against sentence.
3. Crown Court at Leicester — The applicant was acquitted of murder, convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility, and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 12 years and five months and a section 45 A hybrid order under the Mental Health Act 1983.