R v Michael Haslam

Where a guilty plea is not entered as a result of a sentencing indication, the strict Goodyear procedure does not apply, even if the indication preceded the plea. A firm indication may nevertheless create an expectation which fairness requires the appellate court to address if the judge later imposes a more onerous sentence.

A sentencing judge may change his or her view after fuller consideration without new information. The sentence is not necessarily manifestly excessive if it was properly open to the judge. The appellate court may remedy unfairness by suspending the sentence with suitable requirements.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Derby to fraudulent trading arising from the operation of a building company while insolvent. At preliminary hearings, the sentencing judge indicated that the appellant would not be sent to prison, while reserving some room to consider the impact on victims. After hearing victim evidence and submissions, the judge treated the offending as high impact, imposed 28 months’ immediate imprisonment, and later declined to alter that sentence under the slip rule.

The appellant argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that departing from the earlier indication was unfair. The Crown submitted that the earlier comments were informal, non-binding and made before the full impact evidence was considered. The central issues were whether immediate custody was open to the judge and what, if anything, should be done about the expectation created by the earlier indication.

1. Appeal allowed. The sentence of 28 months’ immediate imprisonment was quashed and replaced by a suspended sentence order for the same term, suspended for two years, with a rehabilitation activity requirement for 10 days and 160 hours of unpaid work.
2. The strict Goodyear approach ([2005] EWCA Crim 888) and associated Criminal Procedure Rules apply where a sentencing indication is sought in connection with a guilty plea. They did not apply here because the appellant’s plea followed the resolution of the proposed prosecution of his wife and was not entered as a result of the judge’s comments. The judge therefore acted within principle in discussing sentence in the appellant’s presence.
3. The judge’s statements at the earlier hearings were sufficiently firm to create an expectation, lasting about three months, that the appellant would not receive immediate custody. The fact that the judge had left some room for manoeuvre did not remove that expectation.
4. The judge was entitled to change his mind after hearing evidence, receiving submissions and reflecting further on the case, even though the change was not prompted by new information. Immediate custody was properly open to him and was not manifestly excessive. The case lay on the borderline between suspension and immediate custody.
5. The Court had a discretion whether and how to remedy the resulting unfairness. In the circumstances, and applying the approach illustrated by R v CD ([2018] EWCA Crim 571) and R v Keeling, suspending the sentence with rehabilitation and unpaid-work requirements achieved justice and appropriate punishment.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) ([2026] EWCA Crim 1125 ): The appeal against sentence was allowed. The sentence of 28 months’ immediate imprisonment was quashed and replaced with a 28-month sentence suspended for two years, subject to rehabilitation and unpaid-work requirements.
2. Crown Court at Derby: The appellant was sentenced on 1 July 2026 to 28 months’ immediate imprisonment for fraudulent trading. The judge refused on 3 July 2026 to vary the sentence under Sentencing Act 2020, s 385.