Matthew Haydon v R

For an offence under section 2 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883, likely does not mean more likely than not. Its meaning is determined contextually, and in this statutory context an explosion is likely to endanger life or cause serious injury to property if it could well do so.

The mental element is confined to intending an explosion or foreseeing that an explosion might be caused and continuing to take the risk. The resulting danger is assessed objectively. Foresight of the explosion’s magnitude or of the resulting harm is unnecessary.

The appellant was convicted after a ten-day trial at the Central Criminal Court of causing, contrary to section 2 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883, an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious injury to property. He received an extended determinate sentence of eight years and six months.

With permission, he appealed on three grounds. He challenged the meaning given to likely, the admission of evidence concerning chemicals, devices and experiments found at his home, and the direction on the mental element. The central issues were whether likelihood required a probability exceeding 50 per cent and whether the prosecution had to prove foresight of the explosion’s magnitude or consequences.

1. Appeal dismissed. The conviction and sentence were undisturbed.
2. Meaning of likely. The word is context-dependent. Courts apply ordinary principles of statutory construction, considering the purpose of the enactment, its context, the consequences of competing meanings, and the nature and gravity of the harm. In section 2 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883, Parliament was addressing the inherent danger and unpredictability of explosives and the protection of life and property. The appropriate threshold was therefore whether the explosion could well endanger life or cause serious injury to property, not whether that outcome was more likely than not. The direction given by the trial judge was correct.
3. Admissibility. Evidence of chemicals, devices, notes and experiments found at the appellant’s home was relevant to his knowledge, expertise and the issues of accident, unlawfulness, malice, intention and foresight. It was not advanced as evidence of a plan to injure another person. The material was admissible under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Alternatively, if the appellant’s presentation as a chaotic amateur had created a false impression, the evidence could have been admitted under section 101(1)(f) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
4. Mental element. The requirement that the act be done maliciously is satisfied by an intention to cause an explosion or foresight that an explosion might be caused, coupled with continuing to take the risk. It does not require foresight of any degree of resulting harm or of a particular magnitude. The different statutory language in R v Thacker (Edward) [2021] EWCA Crim 97 did not alter that conclusion.
5. Objective assessment. Whether the explosion was of a nature likely to endanger life or cause serious injury to property is a separate objective question. An explosion greater than intended or foreseen may bear on mitigation, but not on guilt.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against conviction in [2026] EWCA Crim 12.
2. Central Criminal Court: following a jury trial before Mr Justice Johnson, convicted the appellant under section 2 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 and imposed an extended determinate sentence of eight years and six months.