R v Frederic Priestley

Fraud sentencing requires an assessment of the evidence of victim impact. A sentencer should avoid generalised assumptions that victims who supplied no statements suffered equally serious consequences. Financial loss, victim impact and multiple high-culpability features may justify movement within the initial guideline range without adopting the next category’s starting point. Gambling addiction may explain offending and attract mitigation without excusing it.

Good rehabilitation prospects and compliance with court orders do not require suspension where appropriate punishment demands immediate custody.

A judge may participate remotely under section 51(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Remote judicial attendance at sentencing should be exceptional. The statutory safeguards require an interests-of-justice assessment and an opportunity for representations. Advance consultation, a reasoned ruling and a recorded direction promote proper decision-making.

Frederic Priestley pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity to fraud by false representation contrary to sections 1 and 2 of the Fraud Act 2006. He obtained deposits and advance rent by offering accommodation which would not be provided. The offending involved numerous victims over several months. He used the proceeds to fund a longstanding gambling addiction.

Recorder Weekes KC sentenced him in the Crown Court at Inner London to 35 months’ imprisonment. Although everyone else attended in person, the Recorder participated by video link because she could not travel for medical reasons. Counsel received no explanation or advance warning, and no live-link direction was recorded. Priestley raised no complaint that the hearing was unfair.

The Registrar referred his application for leave to appeal against sentence to the Full Court. The court granted leave. The appeal concerned the assessment of victim harm, the allowance for mitigation and whether imprisonment should be suspended. The court also addressed the statutory safeguards and future practice for remote judicial attendance at sentencing.

1. The appeal was allowed to the extent that the sentence of 35 months’ imprisonment was quashed and replaced by 24 months’ imprisonment. The substituted sentence would be served immediately (paras [1], [45]).

2. The Recorder had wrongly assumed that victims who supplied no statements suffered the same serious consequences as those who did. The statements disclosed materially different effects, including differences between victims who recovered money and those who did not. Although one particularly vulnerable victim suffered exceptionally serious consequences, the offending viewed overall involved medium impact. The financial gain, victim impact and two high-culpability features justified movement from the three-year starting point to the four-year upper limit of Category 3. They did not justify adopting Category 2’s five-year starting point (paras [33]–[37]).

3. The allowance for mitigation was insufficient. Relevant features included positive good character, genuine remorse expressed before arrest, acceptance of responsibility and efforts towards rehabilitation. The gambling addiction explained the offending without excusing it. A reduction of 12 months produced a notional sentence after trial of three years. Credit for the earliest guilty plea reduced that sentence to two years (paras [38]–[40]).

4. Applying the Imposition Guideline, the appellant had good rehabilitation prospects, family support and a strong record of compliance. His assessed risk of reoffending remained medium. His personal mitigation justified reducing the term but lacked sufficient strength to justify suspension. The sustained, sophisticated and callous fraud required immediate custody for appropriate punishment. Seriousness may require that outcome even where all factors favouring suspension are present. Where that is the basis for immediate custody, the distinction between terms of 35 and 30 months does not itself justify a different approach to suspension (paras [32], [41]–[44]).

5. By way of guidance, section 51(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 permits a judge to participate remotely in eligible proceedings, including sentencing. Repeal of section 51(1A) left that power intact because the subsection had clarified the existing power. Remote judicial attendance at sentencing, especially where imprisonment is likely, should be rare. Administrative convenience alone is insufficient (paras [5]–[10], [12]).

6. The Resident Judge should be consulted beforehand to explore alternatives. Counsel should receive the proposed arrangement and its reasons as soon as practicable, with an express opportunity to make representations. The judge bears responsibility for ensuring that information reaches counsel. Sensitive personal details need not be disclosed. Where advance notice is impracticable and no practical alternative exists, an initial live-link direction may enable submissions before a final decision about continuing remotely (paras [13]–[14]).

7. A short ruling should explain why remote attendance serves the interests of justice, address the statutory circumstances and representations, and particularly consider effective participation and alternatives. The direction and ruling should be uploaded to the digital case system. These procedural observations supplied prospective guidance; unfairness from the remote hearing formed no ground of appeal (paras [4], [15]–[16]).

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2026] EWCA Crim 1284 , the court granted leave following referral by the Registrar. It quashed the 35-month sentence and substituted 24 months’ immediate imprisonment.
• Crown Court at Inner London: On 12 June 2026, Recorder Weekes KC sentenced the appellant to 35 months’ immediate imprisonment following his early guilty plea to fraud by false representation. No citation for that decision was supplied.