R v Phillip Michael Lee

Whether to suspend a custodial sentence is a matter of judicial discretion. The sentencing judge must consider the relevant guideline factors, including rehabilitation prospects, personal mitigation, impact on dependants, risk, offence seriousness and compliance. A realistic prospect of rehabilitation is relevant but does not require suspension. Immediate custody may be imposed where the seriousness of the offence and concerns about future engagement make that course appropriate. A sentencing judge may rely on a pre-sentence report read with psychiatric material. A reduction for delay is not required where an earlier guilty plea could have avoided the delay. The Court of Appeal will not interfere where the sentence and the decision not to suspend were properly open to the sentencing judge.

This was a renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence after refusal by a single judge. The applicant had pleaded guilty on re-arraignment at the Crown Court at Bournemouth to attempting to engage in sexual communication with a child. He was sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment and made subject to a 10-year sexual harm prevention order.

The proposed grounds were that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the sentencing judge had erred in imposing immediate custody rather than suspending the sentence. The issues included reliance on the pre-sentence and psychiatric reports, personal mitigation, delay, rehabilitation prospects and the application of the guideline factors concerning suspension.

1. Application refused. The court agreed with the single judge that neither proposed ground had merit.
2. The sentencing judge was entitled to rely on the pre-sentence report after reading the reports as a whole. The fact that the pre-sentence report did not elaborate on the applicant's reference to a dissociative voice was immaterial because the psychiatric report addressed the matter and the judge referred to it. The judge was also entitled to find that there was no significant personal mitigation, while acknowledging the applicant's mental health difficulties. The reports supported the conclusion that the applicant understood that his conduct was wrong and understood its consequences.
3. There was no obligation to reduce the sentence for the delay between arrest and the case coming before the court. The applicant could have admitted his guilt earlier, and waited until the first day of trial to change his plea.
4. Whether to suspend a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion. The sentencing judge properly considered the criteria in the Imposition Guideline. A realistic prospect of rehabilitation was a relevant factor, but it did not compel suspension. The judge was entitled to take account of the seriousness of the offence, the risk presented, the absence of sufficiently strong personal mitigation, the limited evidence of harmful impact on the applicant's daughter, and concerns about future engagement with probation interventions. The applicant's period without further offending did not require a different conclusion, particularly in light of his disengagement from the community mental health team.
5. The decision to impose immediate custody was properly open to the sentencing judge. The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was therefore refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused. [2026] EWCA Crim 132
2. Single judge: The initial application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
3. Crown Court at Bournemouth: Following a guilty plea on re-arraignment, the applicant was sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment and made subject to a 10-year sexual harm prevention order.