R v James Ibori

The statutory adjustment for changes in the value of money applies to criminal benefit represented by restrained assets, even where those assets have failed to keep pace with inflation. Confiscation requires payment of the present monetary equivalent of benefit obtained, subject to available assets. Restraint and consequent loss of control do not themselves make that adjustment disproportionate. Proportionality concerns the relationship between the order and the legislation’s legitimate purpose, rather than a general discretion to achieve fairness. The recognised restrictions principally address double recovery through restoration of benefit or equivalent value to the victim.

In determining third-party beneficial ownership, the court may look behind documents to the parties’ actual intentions. It may also assess an unexplained failure to give oral evidence against inferences properly supported by other evidence.

Two unrelated confiscation cases were heard together to determine whether an uplift for changes in the value of money was disproportionate where assets representing criminal benefit had been restrained and had failed to increase correspondingly in value. James Ibori, a former Nigerian state governor convicted of fraud and money laundering offences, appealed against a confiscation order of £101,514,315.21 made at Southwark Crown Court. His appeal concerned bank accounts said to have been frozen without earning interest. The applicable valuation provisions were sections 74(5) and 74(6) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

Arif Patel, convicted of offences involving tax fraud, counterfeit goods and money laundering, renewed his application for permission to appeal against a confiscation order of £90,503,211.96 made at Chester Crown Court. His assets had been restrained and placed under management receivership. He challenged both the inflation uplift under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the finding that sufficient assets were available to satisfy the order.

Sabina Patel, his former wife, separately appealed against the rejection of her claimed beneficial interests in business premises and a property held through a directors’ pension scheme. Her appeal challenged findings of sham ownership and the treatment of her decision not to give oral evidence.

The court dismissed Ibori’s appeal. It granted Arif Patel permission to appeal on the inflation issue but dismissed that appeal, and refused permission on his available-assets ground. Sabina Patel’s appeal was also dismissed.

1. The confiscation regimes were value based. Benefit was identified and valued when obtained, while the order required payment of its equivalent in real terms when the order was made, subject to available assets. The inflation uplift preserved that equivalence. It was a necessary incident of the scheme rather than an additional penalty. An order could be satisfied from legitimate assets even where the original benefit was no longer retained (paras 31, 36–45, 65).

2. Applying the proportionality principles in R v Waya and R v Andrewes, restraint did not make the uplift disproportionate merely because the assets had remained static or underperformed inflation. Their form reflected the defendants’ choices, and restraint followed their criminality and the risk of dissipation. Subsequent seizure or involuntary loss generally did not extinguish benefit, as illustrated by R v Smith (David). Restraint involved neither restoration to the victim nor analogous double recovery (paras 35–53, 63–65).

3. The recent statutory amendments did not govern these orders. In any event, they provided no support for excluding restrained assets from inflation adjustment. The new discretion concerning temporary possession or limited control differed from mandatory proportionality protection. Whether that discretion could extend to restraint remained unresolved (paras 54–59).

4. Ibori’s argument concerning subsequently traced accounts also failed because those accounts were not the benefit valued for the relevant part of his order. Patel’s rental receipts had been adjusted only from receipt, so earlier increases in rent involved no double counting. Proper receivership costs and market performance supplied no basis for reducing the uplift. Patel bore the burden of proving a lower available amount, and the judge was entitled to infer sufficient unidentified assets (paras 60–62, 72–77).

5. Applying Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd, the evidence supported the finding that the documents concerning Sabina Patel’s interest in the business premises were a sham. The parties had not intended her to enjoy beneficial ownership. Registration before the indictment period and receipt of modest rental income did not displace that finding (paras 94–96).

6. Registration and borrowing as trustee did not establish personal beneficial ownership of the pension property. Sabina Patel was outside the scheme’s employee beneficiary class. Consistently with R v Forte, the judge could assess her failure to answer the existing evidence through oral testimony. The prosecution’s burden remained unchanged. No finding on the pension scheme’s overall genuineness was necessary (paras 98–104).

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2026] EWCA Crim 1396 , dismissed Ibori’s appeal on the sole ground permitted by the full court. Granted Arif Patel leave on his inflation ground but dismissed the appeal, and refused renewed leave on his available-assets ground. Dismissed Sabina Patel’s appeal concerning two properties.
• Crown Court at Southwark: Following Ibori’s guilty pleas and sentence in 2012, Judge Tomlinson determined confiscation issues in judgments dated 28 October 2022 and 21 July 2023. On 21 July 2023 he made a confiscation order of £101,514,315.21.
• Crown Court at Chester: Following Arif Patel’s conviction in his absence in April 2023, Judge Everett determined benefit on 3 December 2024 and made a confiscation order of £90,503,211.96 on 28 August 2025. On 19 May 2025 he had rejected Sabina Patel’s third-party ownership application except in respect of her half-interest in the former matrimonial home.