R v Seyi Odeyemi

Where counts are properly joined and arise from the same facts, severance remains a matter for the trial judge’s discretion. Prejudice from a linked sexual-offence count may be overcome by robust directions, particularly where the counts are inextricably intertwined and a joint trial avoids repeated evidence from the complainant.

Intoxication does not itself negate consent. Under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, a section 34 direction does not require a specific question about the fact later relied on. A Sexual Risk Order and its deliberate breach may be relevant to dangerousness, but the breach must not be double-counted as a sentencing aggravation.

Following a trial at Maidstone Crown Court before Her Honour Judge Moore and a jury, the applicant was convicted of rape and breach of a Sexual Risk Order contrary to section 122 H of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. He had separately pleaded guilty to conspiracy to steal, which was transferred for sentence. He received an extended sentence for rape, concurrent sentences for the other offences, and a lengthy sexual harm prevention order.

A single judge refused leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. The applicant renewed those applications. The issues included severance of the SRO count, jury directions concerning intoxication, consent and silence in interview, dangerousness, the effect of age and maturity, sentence length, totality and the sexual harm prevention order.

The court refused both renewed applications for leave to appeal. The conviction was safe, and the sentences were neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

1. Joinder and severance. The trial judge had complied with rule 3.29(4) of the Criminal Procedure Rules and was entitled to conclude that any prejudice could be overcome by robust directions. The counts arose from exactly the same facts and were inextricably intertwined. The SRO required express and informed consent with knowledge of its existence and terms. If the jury were sure of guilt on the breach count, that evidence was admissible on the rape count as relevant to belief in consent and the reasonableness of that belief. A joint trial was also in the public interest because it avoided the complainant giving evidence again. The authorities relied on by the defence, Laycock [2003] Crim LR 803-804 and Lewis [2007] EWCA Crim 2912, were properly distinguished.
2. Jury directions. No general direction was required about the obvious effects of excessive drinking on inhibitions or memory where that case was not advanced at trial. Consent given while disinhibited by alcohol remained legally capable of being consent, even if it would not have been given when sober. That direction accorded with R v Bree [2007] 2 Cr App R 13. Under section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, a specific question need not have been asked. The jury had to decide whether, in all the circumstances, the applicant could reasonably have been expected to volunteer the SRO, intercourse and consent. Legal advice was capable of being a reasonable explanation for silence, but that was for the jury.
3. Dangerousness and sentence. The existence of the SRO, the magistrates’ assessment that it was required to protect the public, the applicant’s knowledge of it and his deliberate breach were relevant to dangerousness. The court observed, obiter, that the judge would not necessarily have erred had she also considered the uncharged allegations that preceded the order. An extended sentence was justified because a determinate sentence would not fully address the current risk. The judge properly considered age and maturity, including the observations in R v Clarke [2018] EWCA Crim 185. The rape categorisation and aggravating factors were sound, and the SRO breach was not double-counted. The sexual harm prevention order was necessary and proportionate.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence refused. [2026] EWCA Crim 162
• Single judge: applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence refused.
• Maidstone Crown Court: convictions for rape and breach of a Sexual Risk Order; extended sentence for rape and concurrent sentences for the other offences.