R v William Cosier

For the partial defence of loss of control, the trial judge must decide whether there is sufficient evidence on which a properly directed jury could reasonably conclude that the defence might apply. That requires a rigorous, common-sense evaluation of all the evidence, directed to the findings open to the jury rather than the judge’s own conclusion on disputed facts. The judge may consider the defendant’s account, conduct before and after the killing, and visual evidence. The absence of any assertion of loss of control is a powerful point against leaving the defence, and a bare lack of recollection does not itself provide an evidential basis. In sentencing for murder, statutory mitigation may include provocation and self-defence falling short of the full defence. Those factors may justify a reduction from the applicable starting point where the case is less serious than others within the same category.

The appellant was convicted of murder at Canterbury Crown Court on 9 October 2024 and sentenced by HHJ Simon James on 1 November 2024 to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 25 years, reduced to 24 years and 134 days by credit for time spent on remand. He appealed against conviction, arguing that loss of control should have been left to the jury, and renewed his application for permission to appeal against sentence.

The conviction appeal concerned whether there was sufficient evidence of loss of self-control, a qualifying trigger and the objective condition under section 54(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The sentence appeal concerned the assessment of intention, aggravating features and statutory mitigation, including provocation and self-defence falling short of the full defence.

1. Conviction appeal dismissed. The court upheld the ruling that loss of control should not be left to the jury. Under sections 54(5) and 54(6) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the question was whether there was sufficient evidence on which a properly directed jury could reasonably conclude that the defence might apply.
2. The trial judge was entitled, and required, to conduct a rigorous evaluation of the evidence. The relevant exercise was to assess the findings which might properly be open to the jury, rather than to substitute the judge’s own assessment of disputed evidence. The absence of any assertion by the appellant that he had lost control was a powerful point against leaving the defence. His lack of recollection of the stabbing could not reasonably be understood as a suggestion of loss of control without further evidence.
3. It was appropriate to consider the appellant’s rational and deliberate actions before and after the stabbing as indications of his state of mind at the time of it. The CCTV showed a short and intense pursuit in which the knife was brandished, but not a frenzied attack. It did not show the appellant reacting to being shot in a way which indicated loss of control in the statutory sense. The court therefore agreed that there was no sufficient evidential basis for leaving the defence to the jury. It was unnecessary to determine the remaining arguments concerning the qualifying trigger and the objective condition.
4. Sentence appeal allowed in part. The judge was entitled to find an intention to kill and to give weight to the public stabbing, disposal of the knife, previous convictions and voluntary intoxication. The judge had also correctly recognised that the deceased’s intention to engage in violent confrontation and the absence of premeditation were mitigating features.
5. However, the judge had underidentified the mitigation. Paragraph 10(d) and (e) of Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020 required regard to provocation and self-defence falling short of the full defence. Both were plainly present: the deceased had provoked the confrontation and fired the BB gun at the appellant, while the appellant might legitimately have perceived himself to be under attack even though his conduct did not amount to lawful self-defence. The appellant’s use of a knife obtained at the pub, rather than brought with him, also bore on the seriousness of the case.
6. The 25-year minimum term was manifestly excessive. The court set it aside, substituted a notional term of 22 years, and deducted 231 days spent on remand, resulting in a minimum term of 21 years and 134 days.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) [2026] EWCA Crim 2: the conviction appeal was dismissed. The sentence appeal was allowed in part and the minimum term was reduced to 21 years and 134 days after credit for 231 days on remand.
2. Canterbury Crown Court: following conviction on 9 October 2024, HHJ Simon James sentenced the appellant on 1 November 2024 to life imprisonment with a 25-year minimum term, reduced to reflect time spent on remand.